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Foreword 
 
For the past four years, the international team of Nazarbayev University Graduate 
School of Education’s researchers and faculty members has jointly worked with local 
policy makers, practitioners and stakeholders on the diagnostic analysis of priority areas 
of the current educational reforms in Kazakhstan. With the official title of Development 
of Strategic Directions for Education Reforms in Kazakhstan for 2015-2020, the Project 
has been informally recognized as the Roadmap group. The study has aimed to provide 
analytical support for the development and implementation of national policies across 
different sectors of education.  
 
In 2016, based on the discussions held with policy makers, education leaders, 
practitioners and other stakeholders, the project team has focused on studying issues of 
university sustainability in respect of the current higher education funding model in 
Kazakhstan as the one of the main priority directions of the country’s education system. 
Guided by the strategic policy documents “The President’s National Plan ‘100 Concrete 
Steps’”, State Programme for the Development of Education 2011-2020, State 
Programme for the Development of Education and Science 2016-2019, the work on the 
project team included data collection and analysis via arranging meetings with 
practitioners, visits to mainstream secondary schools, colleges and universities across 
the country to receive evidence of the current progress of the educational reforms as 
well as identify their strengths and weaknesses for the further modernization of the 
education sector in the country. The project team also met with leading international 
analysts that provided their expertise in the priority themes of the Project. The study has 
availed itself of the comprehensive review and analysis of Kazakhstan’s past and 
present policies and practices that have accumulated local best practices (Diagnostic 
Report, 2014).  
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Executive Summary 
 
Over the last years the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan has started to apply new approaches to higher education funding. The 
attempt to try and implement new funding mechanisms is based on the fact that 
Kazakhstan departed from the principle of “funding to all” to the principle of “funding 
to everybody”. The coverage of the student’s tuition fees rather than funding an 
academic institution has become part of the common practice.  
 
The financial mechanism of higher educational institutions is based on the multichannel 
system of financing. In these conditions not only the sufficiency of financial resources 
but also the optimum combination of various sources of financing, their influence, both 
on the development of a higher educational institution and the quality of specialists 
training is important. To increase the level of its competitiveness a higher educational 
institution has to adhere to an efficient strategy of development, optimum financial 
policy and actual management in the implementation of own activity.  
 
In modern market conditions of managing an objective need in increasing the 
productivity of budgetary funds allocated for financing of expenses on higher education 
has arisen. Models of financing should be notable for flexibility, responsiveness to 
market initiatives, using education opportunities during whole life. In this respect, 
resources should be aimed not for support but for efficient development of Kazakhstani 
educational system taking into account international experience and national features. 
 
On the whole, the initial proposals of the report are for comment and debate. The main 
concerns are to reduce inequities in educational outcomes and inefficiencies in the 
distribution of resources and to raise the quality of educational achievement for all. The 
report is advocating policies and programmes which will ensure that strategic reforms 
and innovations are successfully implemented in a purposeful and timely manner and 
which build on the best of current and past practice in Kazakhstan.  
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1. University Sustainability in Relation to Higher Education Funding Model in 
Kazakhstan in the Context of Transition Period  
 
This report present an analysis of the funding of higher education in the Republic of 
Kazakhstan.
1
 The report is prepared for the Graduate School of Education of the 
Nazarbayev University (NU) in Astana in Kazakhstan as part of the policy study on the 
future directions for the Kazakhstani higher education system titled “The Development 
of Strategic Directions for the Education Reforms in the Republic of Kazakhstan for 
2015-2020”. The underlying study provides food for thought for the further 
development of the higher education funding structures and mechanisms in Kazakhstan 
on the basis of extensive information made available by Nazarbayev University 
Graduate School of Education and on the basis of a large number of interviews 
conducted with a range of experts and representatives of the key stakeholders in 
Kazakhstan’s higher education sector, including the Ministry of Education and Science 
of the Republic of Kazakhstan as well as many public and private universities. 
 
Various stakeholders provided rich information on particularly the funding instruments 
and mechanisms that apply to higher education in Kazakhstan, such as the way in which 
the government allocates its public funds to universities, the role of tuition fees as well 
as the contributions of the private business sector. The interviewees represented public 
authorities, a wide range of national, state and private institutions active in 
Kazakhstan’s higher education, institutions from various geographical locations in the 
country as well as actors at the rectorate level, faculty level and support units. As a 
result, the reflections presented in this study provide a comprehensive analysis of how 
the funding mechanisms in Kazakhstan’s higher education are perceived in terms of 
their logics, effectiveness and practical implications for various actors in the system. 
 
Next to the interviews conducted, this study relies on international publications on 
higher education financing (e.g. Arnhold et al., 2014; de Boer et al., 2014) as well as a 
number of reports and policy papers on higher education in Kazakhstan (e.g. Canning et 
al., forthcoming, the Ministry of Education and Science, 2016; NUGSE, 2014). The 
information and data collected in this project are analysed and assessed in terms of the 
                                                          
1
 All analyses, interpretations and statements are the prime responsibility of the authors. 
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broader framework of the strategic objectives of higher education in Kazakhstan as well 
as the academic and expert discourse on funding of higher education. 
1.1. Structure of the study 
 
This study starts with a brief explanation of the project. In order to structurally reflect 
on the funding mechanisms of higher education in Kazakhstan, this report discusses a 
general analytical framework for assessing financial relationships and instruments in 
higher education. Firstly, we present a state-of-the-art overview of higher education in 
Kazakhstan, including a brief description of the funding mechanisms that are applied. 
We then discuss the implications of the current funding structures and mechanisms from 
the various stakeholder perspectives encountered during the interviews and data 
collection exercises. Finally, we provide a number of conclusions and food for thought 
to further develop the funding mechanisms in Kazakhstan’s higher education in the 
context of the strategic objectives of the system. Based on an “outsider’s perspective”, 
the Report concludes with providing some concrete policy recommendations to be 
considered. 
1.2. Research design and methodology 
 
The present study seeks to examine how the current higher education funding model in 
Kazakhstan supports sustainability of higher education institutions (HEI) and strategic 
development goals for higher education and science as outlined in the national higher 
education and science development framework documents the State Programme for 
Education Development 2011-2020 (MoES, 2010) and the State programme for 
Education and Science Development 2016-2019 (MoES, 2016). This research applies 
case study research design (Yin, 1984) engaging multiple perspectives of higher 
education stakeholders which represent different types of higher education institutions 
and the Ministry of Education and Science.   
 
One set of primary data in this study comes from the total of 18 semi-structured face-to-
face interviews with high and medium-level leadership representatives at 15 institutions 
of higher education (Table 3). These interviews were conducted in July and September 
of 2016. The first round of interviews conducted in July, 2016 informed researchers 
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about the perspectives that representatives of higher education institutions hold about 
the current higher education funding model in Kazakhstan and how it supports 
sustainability of higher education institutions in the country. The first round of 
interviews also allowed verifying the interview protocol which was applied during a 
more extensive second round of data collection conducted for this research in 
September.  
 
Table 1. Data sources 
 
# Institutions represented in the study Participants interviewed 
 
1. Ministry of Education and Science, Republic of 
Kazakhstan 
Department level leadership 
engaged with higher education 
and higher education funding 
policy 
2. Autonomous public comprehensive institution 
of higher education offering programmes in 
various areas of studies. 
Representative of central HEI 
administration 
3. Public HEI of regional importance specializing 
in one area of studies while also offering 
programmes in other directions of studies, 
located in Central Kazakhstan. 
Representatives of institutional 
leadership 
4. Public HEI of regional importance offering 
programmes in various directions of studies, 
located in Eastern Kazakhstan. 
Representatives of institutional 
leadership 
5. Public HEI of regional importance specializing 
in one area of studies. 
Representatives of institutional 
leadership 
6. Public HEI of regional importance offering 
programmes in various directions of studies, 
located in Western Kazakhstan. 
Representatives of institutional 
leadership 
7. Public HEI specializing in one area of studies, 
located in Western Kazakhstan 
Representatives of institutional 
leadership 
8. Joint stock company HEI mainly specializing 
in one direction of studies. 
Representatives of institutional 
leadership 
9. Joint stock company HEI offering study 
programmes in social sciences.  
Representatives of institutional 
leadership 
10. Public national university offering programmes 
in various areas of studies. 
Representatives of institutional 
leadership 
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Table 1. Data sources (continued) 
 
11. Public national university specializing in one 
area of studies while also offering programmes 
in other directions of studies.  
 
Representatives of institutional 
leadership 
12. Public national comprehensive university 
offering programmes in various areas of 
studies. 
 
Representatives of institutional 
leadership 
13. Public national university specializing in one 
direction of studies. 
 
Representatives of institutional 
leadership 
14. Public national university specializing in one 
direction of studies. 
 
Representatives of institutional 
leadership 
 
 
Of the total number of institutions engaged in this study, one is an autonomous higher 
education institution delivering higher education in multiple directions of studies as a 
comprehensive-type university.  Another five institutions of higher education 
represented in this study are public HEIs of regional importance. Three of them offer 
study programmes in multiple directions of studies, while two of them specialize in one 
area of studies. Two institutions of higher education in the sample of this study have the 
status of Joint Stock Company which means public and private co-ownership of a HEI. 
The primary field of studies is social sciences for both of these institutions, although 
one of them appears to be more specialized in one area of studies. Further data in this 
study comes from five national universities, two of which specialize in one area of 
studies while other three are more comprehensive in their offer of study programs. 
Finally, perspectives of two private institutions of higher education are also represented 
in the data of this study.  
 
Face to face semi-structured interviews with two officials at the Ministry of Education 
and Science form the second set of primary data in this study. The heads of two 
departments at ministry interviewed for this study possess expertise important in 
describing and evaluating the fit between the approach in higher education funding, 
sustainability of HEIs, and the national strategic development goals for the sector of 
higher education. 
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An advantage of case study research design is that it enables triangulation of various 
perspectives in examining a single phenomenon which in this case is the alignment of 
higher education funding, sustainability of HEIs, and the national vision of strategic 
goals in the sector (Yin, 2009: 116). Triangulation of stakeholders’ perspectives on how 
the current higher education funding model supports sustainability of HEIs and aligns 
with national strategic development goals for the sector in this study is achieved by 
diversity of institutional profiles which study participants represent. Triangulation of the 
different perspectives on the issue addressed in this study forms the core of data 
analysis approach in this paper.  
 
In addition to triangulation of stakeholders’ perspectives, data analysis in this study 
utilizes a normative framework on characteristics of higher education funding which 
also includes result or output oriented higher education funding model. This model is 
derived from research which informs about internationally effective approaches in 
higher education funding aimed at achieving higher education goals associated with 
such public goods as increased quality of human capital, labor market outcomes, quality 
of higher education, and alike.   
Based on the design of this study, interview data in the report was analyzed for the 
following themes: (1) the strategic priorities of Kazakhstan’s higher education sector 
and the individual universities; (2) the operation of the State Grant System; the role of 
tuition fees; (3) resource diversification (including the role of regional authorities); (4) 
the level of financial autonomy and its relation to transparency; (5) performance 
incentives in the system; and (6) student financial support. Observations emerging from 
the interview data are described in interview data results section followed by the 
analysis of policy options for Kazakhstan to enhance the fit between higher education 
funding model, sustainability of higher educational institutions, and national strategic 
goals in higher education. 
1.3. Analytical framework for higher education funding 
 
Funding of higher education is a complex activity with many stakeholders, potential 
relationships, funding arrangements and financial streams. This leads to a continuous 
balancing act between a multitude of interests, historically grown situations, legal and 
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practical limitations and political processes. Therefore, funding arrangements often 
contain multiple elements and incentives. 
 
 
Figure 1: Framework for analysing higher education funding arrangements (Vossensteyn, J.J., 
2015) 
 
In order to analyse higher education funding arrangements, this nowadays takes place in 
the context of international developments and strategic priorities set by the individual 
states. In this context, the Modernisation Agenda for higher education in Europe forms 
an interesting reference framework for analysing and benchmarking national funding 
arrangements (European Commission, 2011). Regarding the financing of higher 
education, the Modernisation Agenda for the past five years stressed that: 
 
1. States should ensure a sufficient level of funding for HE (reduce funding gap 
with US & Japan) 
2. States should examine their mix of student fees and support schemes in the light 
of their actual efficiency and equity 
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3. Financial autonomy: Universities should be responsible and accountable for their 
resources 
4. University funding should be focused on relevant outputs rather than on inputs 
5. States should find the right balance between core, competitive and outcome-
based funding 
 
Modern higher education funding is concerned with finding the right balance between 
financial autonomy, resource diversification and performance orientation. This is related 
to the overall developments from central state steering towards more market regulation 
and decentralised decision-making in which competition and linking budgets to 
performance gains importance. 
 
More market-based principles aim to stimulate more efficiency, greater demand 
orientation, responsiveness among stakeholders like institutions and students and 
rationality. On the other hand, higher education also remains to have some “public 
good” characteristics and thus government should stay involved. Therefore, introducing 
more self-regulation, competition and performance orientation should always be 
accompanied with some form of monitoring and continuous dialogue to prevent too 
much complexity and diversity in the way higher education is performed. This leads to a 
growing role for accountability and quality assurance in contemporary higher education. 
1.4. Funding models for higher education: issues, objectives and options 
 
Experiences have shown that traditional state funding mechanisms in higher education 
often include a number of specific problems: 
 Line-item budgeting and input control: these lead to relative inflexibility and a 
disconnection between higher education objectives and funding 
 Annual budgets: these lead to situations of “December fever” where units have 
to spend all their funds within a year because they otherwise have to return the 
left over budget and will face budget cuts the next year. Annual budgets can also 
lead to instability and no reliable calculation base, particularly if the funding 
ministry has an unstable budget or priority setting. 
 Incremental budgeting: the historical basis does not provide incentives to 
improve or renew performances of HEIs. 
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 Ex-ante state allocations: often include low information about real costs and 
performances and provide little room for flexibility. They also often contain a 
bottom-up approach of financial plans from multiple deans with their own wish-
lists and nobody capable to make a realistic priority setting 
 Steering through regulations: leads to uniform solutions for diverse situations 
and problems as well as to very strategic institutional behaviour. 
 Little financial sources: lead to a strong dependency of HEIs on state funding 
running the risk of serious problems in case of strong changes on the 
government side. 
 
Based on these problems, a number of criteria can be developed that help to improve 
public funding models for higher education (Arnhold et al., 2014): 
 
 Stability: in order to guarantee a certain level of basic infrastructure (equipment, 
staff and knowledge) there should be some level of stability in the funds 
provided to HEIs. This can be in the form of fixed footings per institution, 
programme or core group. This has to happen in a transparent way and 
potentially based on a basic conception of costs. There should be only limited 
room for adjustments over time with only a long term orientation towards the 
likelihood of existence or non-existence of particular activities. 
 Incentives: a part of the funds should be given on the basis of incentives in order 
to stimulate competition, demand orientation, performance orientation and the 
promotion of strategic goals, profiles and innovation. 
 Autonomy and flexibility: on the side of the HEIs in order to internally allocate 
the funds in an appropriate and flexible way. To allow individual priority setting 
in order to achieve profiling. This also includes potential for reserves and 
investment behaviour. 
 Legitimisation: in order to ensure a proper spending of tax-payer money. This 
implies that HEIs need to be transparent about how they spend their resources as 
well as that they are held accountable for their outcomes, performances and 
proper processes: accountability. 
 It is important is that funding mechanisms need to have a strategy that give 
direction towards the priorities set at system level: funding without strategy 
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lacks orientation and strategy without funding is useless because HEIs cannot 
invest in the activities wished from them or have no incentive to do so. Whether 
we like it or not: Money is the ultimate driver of the system. 
 
Altogether, this means that higher education funding mechanisms could contain three 
“pillars” that represent the core tasks of the funding model: 
1. a stable basic-funding part to stimulate stability to perform basic tasks and cost 
orientation 
2. a performance-oriented part that stimulates objectives and performance 
orientation 
3. an innovation-oriented part that enables investments in strategic objectives 
 
1.4.1. Options for funding models 
 
When national governments allocate funds to the publicly funded higher education 
institutions in their system, there are various options to do this. A few of them have 
already been indicated in the previous paragraph. The major options include the 
following (de Boer et al., 2014): 
 Discretionary incremental funding in which the government allocates the budget 
like the previous year with a potential compensation for inflation correction or 
growth in the system. 
 Contracts with individual HEIs based on negotiations about their mission. These 
can be detailed individual agreements or more broad framework contracts. 
 Project funding through a system of competing proposals: either for teaching, 
research or any other type of activity. 
 Formula funding: This means that institutions are allocated funds for various 
types of cost- or performance indicators that are weighted according to their 
priority and context. As funding formulas apply to all institutions, they 
guarantee that different HEIs are treated equally and thus promote transparency 
and fairness. They do not prescribe how the funds should be allocated within a 
HEI. 
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 Vouchers: public funding is provided to students in terms of “learning 
entitlements” that they can spend at the institution and/or programme of their 
choice. 
These options are reflected in Figure 2.   
 
 
Figure 2: Funding options for allocating public funds to HEIs 
 
Of course, depending on the national context and objectives within the system, a 
combination of the various funding options and indicators within them can be chosen. 
 
1.4.2. Lump sum financing and the (dis)advantages of decentralisation 
 
In order to stimulate financial autonomy, most countries provide the public funding 
nowadays by means of a lump sum (block grant) which enables HEIs to internally 
allocate funds according to their own wishes (within certain limits). This means that this 
will generate a certain decentralisation within the system. This is often advocated for 
reasons of allocative efficiency in the system. But there should always be a proper 
balance between centralisation and decentralisation in terms of autonomy and 
responsibility, balancing between academic values versus the logic of the market, as 
well as between rich and poor units/departments and institutions. The advantages and 
disadvantages of decentralisation may also have an impact on the funding model chosen 
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in the higher education system or within individual HEIs (Sagintayeva & Kurakbayev, 
2015). 
 
Advantages of decentralisation are: 
 
 Increased responsibility of units/institutions for their activities requiring more 
vision, profile, strategy, transparency and visibility 
 Increased cost-effective use of resources, as responsible units/institutions may 
want to do more with their resources if they have better insight in the costs of 
their activities 
 Increased speed of decision making as a result of a stronger feeling of the impact 
of their actions 
 Increased accountability as the “principal” wants to know what the “agent” does 
with its autonomy and resources 
 Empowered institutions or units that really have decision-making power can 
develop a greater innovative capacity  
 
Opposed to the potential positive impact of decentralisation there also may be a number 
of disadvantages: 
 
 There may be a lack of coordination between institutions and/or units. Various 
“shopkeepers” may achieve their own missions and objectives. 
 Units and institutions may tend to shift their costs to other units and act as free 
riders. 
 Decentralising responsibility does not mean that units or institutions have the 
professional capacities wisely manage their decision-making power: e.g. often 
units or institutions need time to learn to use their freedom and to “play the 
game”. 
 Decentralising responsibilities also implies that institutions and/or units are more 
transparent and accountable about their day-to-day operation and results. This 
requires more administrative transparency and bureaucracy. 
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The extent to which these advantages and disadvantages depend on the level of trust and 
verification is in the system. These are partially determined by the exact financing 
instruments in use as well as the extent of accountability. More autonomous institutions 
or units have to earn the trust given to them. 
 
How the different interests and objectives are being achieved with funding higher 
education depends to a large extent on the instruments chosen. The instruments make 
the difference and the rationale behind the instruments largely determine whether a 
difference can be made. Rationales behind a funding system should reflect the priorities 
in a system (or in an internal allocation model):  
 
 Does one want to provide the HE system with stability or incentives? 
 Is there a culture which allows market simulations or more (political) 
negotiations? 
 Is the government prepared to underpin its strategic objectives with financial 
incentives that can make a difference? 
 
2.  Higher education funding in Kazakhstan: state of the art 
 
The funding of higher education in Kazakhstan – like in most countries – is embedded 
in the key characteristics of the higher education system and financial traditions that 
govern the public service system in general. In this section, we present a brief overview 
of the higher education system as well as the funding structure of higher education in 
Kazakhstan. 
2.1. Kazakhstan’s higher education system: the context  
 
Kazakhstan is the 9
th
 largest country in the world with its 2,725,000 square kilometres 
and small to medium sized in terms of population with around 17.5 million inhabitants. 
Kazakhstan is located in Central Asia and populated by several ethnic groups. The main 
groups are Kazakhs (about 63%), Russians (24%) and Uzbeks (3%) and Ukrainians 
(2%) (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kazakhstan). In recent years the number of 
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inhabitants has substantially increased resulting in a larger potential student population 
and substantial increase of particularly privately paid-for higher education. 
 
Higher education is regulated at the level of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan and the Law “On Education” and corresponding official decrees and 
bylaws. The Law “On Education” identifies the main principles determining the 
content, management, organization of universities, teachers and students; the status of 
teachers, financing and international activities.
2
 
 
The state educational standards of higher education (SES) set requirements for all 
higher education institutions on the content of higher education curriculum, the level of 
teaching of students and the volume of teaching load. In February 2016,  the new SES 
was approved according to which academic freedom of universities in defining the 
content of undergraduate programmes was extended up to 65% (previously it was 
55%)
3
.  
 
In the context of the transition towards institutional autonomy, boards of trustees have 
been established in 28 public universities. Since 2015, in terms of public accountability 
and transparency, rectors of national universities have started to deliver annual reports 
to the public and stakeholders. 
 
To date, higher education in Kazakhstan is offered by 131 higher education institutions 
of which 57 are public institutions and 77 privately owned institutions.  Over the past 10 
years, a network of universities has decreased almost by 28% due to the demographic 
decline and government measures to optimize the institutions of higher education – 
basically shutting down private institutions delivering poor quality education services. 
The highest number of universities is concentrated in Almaty – 42 HEIs that make 33% 
of all the academic institutions. Other regions with the highest number of universities 
are Astana (14), South Kazakhstan (11) and Karaganda regions (9). 60% of the entire 
                                                          
2 Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan “On education” № 319-III from July 27, 2007  
3 Resolution of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan from May 13, 2016 № 292 On 
amendments and additions to the Decree of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan from August 
23, 2012 № 1080 "On approval of the state obligatory standards of education relevant levels of education" 
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network of HEIs is in the mentioned four regions. The smallest number of universities 
are located in the Mangystau and North Kazakhstan regions. 
 
In terms of the public-private divide, one can discern main 7 types of higher education 
institutions in Kazakhstan. The type of higher education institution is determined at the 
licensing stage and depends on the number of programmes and orientation of the 
research work. The different types of institutions are as follows: 
 
 1 autonomous education of organization (Nazarbayev University) 
 1 international university (International Kazakh-Turkish University) 
 10 national universities which are leading scientific and methodological centres 
in the country with a special status 
 14 non-civic academies that particularly offer higher education programmes in 
one or two specialisations 
 32 state universities that offer higher education programmes at bachelor, master 
and doctoral level and predominantly carry out pure and applied research 
 17 Joint Stock Company institutions, of which one – the Nazarbayev University 
– is a special autonomous status organization for education. The JSC institutions 
offer education programmes at all levels and conduct scientific as well as 
applied research. 
 56 private institutions, offering professional higher education programmes 
 
Selected private HEIs meeting the criteria set by the Ministry of Education and Science 
can also receive public funding. In 2014, 69 institutions out of the 125 institutions were 
awarded public subsidies. Figure 3 shows the breakdown of Kazakhstan’s HEIs 
according to the type of ownership and operation  
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Figure 3: Kazakhstan’s HEIs according to the type of ownership and operation 
 
The total number of undergraduate students in Kazakhstan is close to 480.000 of which 
about 142.000 (27%) are publicly funded through the State Grant system  and about 
336.000 (73%) are fully self-funded students, paying the full costs of higher education 
themselves (National Centre for Educational Statistics and Evaluation, 2015). The total 
number of 480.000 students compared to a total population of about 17.7 million 
inhabitants implies that around 40% of all youngsters attend higher education, which is 
comparable to many developed countries. 
 
2.2. Strategic objectives of higher education in Kazakhstan 
 
The State Programme for Education and Science Development 2016-2019 (SPESD),  
recently ratified by the decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, has 
formulated a number of strategic objectives for higher education and science (Ministry 
of Education and Science, 2016). The overall strategic objective for higher education for 
the 2016-2019 is: 
 
”to improve the competitiveness of higher education and science as well as the 
development of human capital for sustainable economic growth”. 
10 
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This strategic priority has to be achieved by pursuing two (2) main objectives and a 
number of more detailed ambitions as formulated in the SPESD (MoES, 2016): 
 
 Providing industry with professional highly trained and quality personnel 
o Increasing the proportion of higher education graduates – who studied with State 
Grants – that are being employed in the first year after graduation 
o Increasing the number of universities in the higher ranges of the QS-WUR 
global university rankings 
o Providing high quality and competitive specialists 
o Modernisation of the content of higher and postgraduate education 
o Creating conditions for the commercialisation of research and technology 
o Strengthen spiritual and moral values 
o Enhancing management and monitoring of the developments in higher and 
postgraduate education 
 Making real scientific contributions to the diversification and sustainable 
development of the economy and the integration of higher education, science and 
innovation 
o Increasing the share of experimental research 
o Increasing the share of commercialising research projects 
o Increasing the contribution of science to the development of the national 
economy, e.g. through more industry expenditures and higher numbers of 
patents 
o Strengthening the research capacity and status of researchers 
o Modernisation of science infrastructure 
o Strengthening the management and monitoring of science 
 
Though access to high quality primary, secondary and vocational education is 
mentioned as an explicit strategic objective for education and the State Program for 
Education and Science Development stresses the issue of inclusive learning 
environments for special needs students, access to higher education is not included in 
the strategic agenda (SPESD, 2011, p. 19). 
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2.3. Funding of higher education in Kazakhstan  
 
Over the years, the share of Kazakhstan’s national wealth spent on higher education 
remained relatively stable between 2001 and 2014 at around 0,4% of GDP. In 2013 and 
2014, public spending on tertiary education remained unchanged and amounted to 0.4% 
of GDP
4
. According to available data on post-Soviet countries, Kazakhstan government 
spending on tertiary education was 4.8 times lower than in Ukraine, 2 times lower than 
in Belarus and Kyrgyzstan
5
. It is worth-noting that average spending on tertiary 
education is 1.3% of GDP (2013) among OECD countries
6
. Thus, in Kazakhstan, state 
spending on higher education is 3.3 times below of OECD. Hence, both as a percentage 
of GDP as well as in terms of expenditure per student, state funding for higher 
education is low in Kazakhstan in comparison to the EU and OECD averages (NUGSE 
2014; OECD, 2014). Nevertheless. In absolute terms, the budget for higher education in 
Kazakhstan has increased significantly since 2001 (Canning et al. 2017, forthcoming). 
As public expenditure for higher education is relatively low, Kazakhstan’s higher 
education relies heavily on private sources of funding. About 73% of students have to 
rely predominantly on their own family resources to pay the full cost covering tuition 
fees charged by private as well as public universities. Public funding is only available 
for about 27% of all students. 
 
The current constellation of financing higher education in Kazakhstan was created in 
1999. It has remained largely unchanged since then and consists of five main elements: 
(1) the State Grants system covering the tuition fees of high achieving and quotas for 
disadvantaged students; (2) Tuition fees paid by students and their families; (3) Public 
subsidies for graduate programmes (at masters and PhD level); (4) Student loans and 
Family savings plans; and (5) Employers’ contributions. Each of these will be briefly 
discussed below. 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 The World Bank. World Data Bank. Education Statistics - All Indicators.
 http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=education-statistics-~-all-indicators# 
5 The World Bank Data, 2013 
6 Education at a Glance 2016. OECD INDICATORS. 230 p. http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/education/education-at-a-glance-2016_eag-2016-en  
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State Grants System 
 
Students enrolling in higher education either receive funding through the State Grants 
System – which makes part of the State Educational Order System, i.e. the public 
budget for education – or pay for it from their own or their family’s personal funds. The 
State Grants system is the main mechanism for both allocating public funds to 
universities and ensuring access to higher education for the brightest students and for 
some special-needs categories. The State Grants are mostly awarded on the basis of 
merit to students who score best in the Unified National Test which is taken at the end 
of secondary education. As such, about 27% of all students in higher education receive 
the State Grants which cover their tuition fee costs (Canning et al., forthcoming). 
Because students in principle can use the grants to study a particular study programme 
at the university of their choice, these State Grants can be considered as a form of 
higher education vouchers. However, even though the money follows the student, the 
money is given to the university where a “State Grant student” enrolls. The spending 
freedom of students is further limited by the fact that the number of State Grants per 
university as well as per academic programme is regulated by the state. In practice, 
publicly subsidised universities have limited numbers of “State Grant students”. In total, 
about 91% of total public funding for higher education is allocated to universities 
through the State Grants System.  
 
A further 1% of total public funds available for higher education is allocated through 
students from disadvantaged groups such as students from rural areas, orphans and 
disabled students (Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 
2014; NUGSE, 2014). For each of these designated groups some quotas are applied. 
The majority of such quota are for students from rural areas (over 90%). Because of 
lower quality primary and secondary education in rural areas, they otherwise would not 
be able to compete with urban students for State Grants.   
 
Almost all state grants are allocated for full-time students. Public universities enrol 
more than 75% of all grant recipients, including state funded graduate students and 
quota students. 
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Another interesting feature of the State Grants is that the tariff differs by type of 
institution (university) where students enroll. The State Grants for students at National 
Universities are twice as high as for students at State Universities or Joint Stock 
Company Universities,  643,000 and 348,000 Tenge respectively ($3,600 versus $1,900 
USD: July 2015 values; Canning et al., forthcoming). The main reasons for this 
difference is the difference in salary levels between staff – academics and teachers at 
National Universities are higher qualified – and the stronger research function of 
National Universities.
7
  
 
Tuition fees paid by students 
 
Apart from the State Grants System, Kazakhstan’s higher education relies heavily on 
the tuition fee contributions from students and their families. About 73% of students use 
their own or family resources to pay tuition fees. More than half (63%) of these fee-
paying students go to private institutions. At universities that enrol students who receive 
State Grants, the tuition fees for fully self-funded students are not allowed to be lower 
than the State Grants (Development of Strategic Directions for Education Reforms in 
Kazakhstan for 2015-2020 Diagnostic Report, 2014). As such, private tuition fees are at 
least at the same level as state grants. Thus, if the Government were to increase the 
amount of the state grant, then private institutions may have to also increase their fees 
which will make it more difficult for poorer students to attend higher education. 
 
Public subsidies for graduate programmes 
 
The remaining 8% of the public budget for higher education is distributed among 
publicly subsidised universities for graduate programs, such as masters and PhD 
programmes. 
 
Student loans and Family savings plans 
 
                                                          
7
  Source: http://www.government.kz/ru/postanovleniya/postanovleniya-pravitelstva-rk-za-maj-
2014-goda/16968-ob-utverzhdenii-gosudarstvennogo-obrazovatelnogo-zakaza-na-podgotovku-
spetsialistov-s-vysshim-i-poslevuzovskim-obrazovaniem-a-takzhe-s-tekhnicheskim-i-professionalnym-
poslesrednim-obrazovaniem-v-organizatsiyakh-obrazovaniya-finansiruemykh-iz-respublikansk.html 
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In order to help students who have to pay the full costs of higher education themselves, 
Kazakhstan has introduced guaranteed student loans through the private banking system 
since 2005. The student loan scheme covers all types of tertiary education and is 
available for all students, including fulltime, part-time or distance education students.  
Loans can be obtained in most private banks throughout Kazakhstan. The loan amount 
more or less equals the tuition costs of the programme attended by the student. By 2015, 
only 6000 students had taken up student loans since they were introduced. This 
relatively low loan take-up ratio is due to the high interest rate to be paid 
(approximately 13% in 2014), the rather strict repayment conditions and the complex 
administrative processes for taking up loans. 
 
In addition, through the State Educational Accumulative System (SEAS) the 
government tries to stimulate families to regularly save money for their children’s 
future education and training. These learning accounts are State subsidised (Finance 
Center of the Ministry of Education and Science 2016). Through this SEAS program, all 
Kazakhstani citizens are allowed to make savings for higher education investments with 
some tax benefits, which provides stronger benefits to those paying more taxes. While 
this is a promising initiative, it has started only in 2014-2015 and thus cannot be 
assessed for its effectiveness. 
 
Employers’ contributions 
 
A final form of higher education financing in Kazakhstan is the 1% tax levy over 
business profits that local industry has to pay to the region and which is supposed to be 
spent on higher education (via scholarships for students) and research. This type of tax 
levy is mostly generated from the international gas industry. The total number of 
scholarships varies significantly between 200 to as many as 13 000 per year, depending 
on the year of distribution. More of these industry scholarships are allocated to 
institutions that educate the employees of the company and they appear to benefit 
mostly public institutions (NUGSE, 2014).  
 
Because this type of revenue has a predominant regional focus and company profits 
vary strongly between years, the 1% tax levy is not a stable funding source and leads to 
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a strong fluctuation in the resources and number of scholarships available. In addition, 
because it concerns a regional taxation mechanism, these extra revenues do not benefit 
universities in regions that lack strong industries and companies. 
 
2.4. Sustainability of the current funding model 
 
As stated above, within the Roadmap Project, many stakeholders from various 
universities have been interviewed about their perceptions on the funding arrangements 
and their practical implications for the day-to-day operation of the institutions. 
Including all types of institutions – public, private, national, state and joint stock 
companies – representatives at various levels in the institutions as well as 
representatives of public authorities, provided a comprehensive and diversified image of 
the higher education sector in Kazakhstan and the role of funding in that.  
 
The main observations and findings can be clustered in various ways. We here will 
particularly follow the structure of the interview protocol that guided the interviews. As 
such, the following overarching themes will be discussed below: 1) the strategic 
priorities of Kazakhstani higher education and the individual universities; 2) the 
operation of the State Grant System; 3) the role of tuition fees; 4) resource 
diversification (including the role of regional authorities); 5) the level of financial 
autonomy and its relation to transparency; 6) performance incentives in the system; and 
7) student financial support. 
 
2.4.1. Strategic priorities of Kazakhstan’s higher education and universities 
 
Based on the various interviews, we formulate the following observations: 
 In general, most stakeholders are not very focused on the national strategic 
objectives. 
 Only the most competitive universities aim at a high position in the global university 
rankings. 
 There is a general understanding that Key Performance Indicators will get a stronger 
focus in the future. 
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 The quality of education is perceived to be basically guaranteed by State Grants and 
accreditation. However, some interviewees stress that the quality of teaching is low 
and should be seriously improved through new didactical approaches, preventing 
fraud and teacher competences.  
 Some argue that the Unified National Test is not a valid indication of academic 
quality. The UNT is a snapshot taken at one moment (therefore – since 2016 – it is 
allowed to take the UNT twice); high achievers are said to not always be hard 
workers and the UNT is testing ability to memorise rather than understanding and 
other academic competences (Winter et al., 2014). 
 Higher education institutions appear to develop a stronger focus on internal quality 
assurance systems. Though many stimulate or are stimulated to apply for 
international accreditation, the type of international accreditations applied for is not 
of top level. Some respondents (from better private universities) argue that dubious 
accreditation organisations should be cancelled from the recognised list in 
Kazakhstan. 
 If the quality of education is really aimed to be improved, many measures are 
necessary to empower institutions to do so, including a better engagement of students 
in university management, integrating modern educational approaches and 
technologies, staff assessments, professionalization teachers, have class 
consultations, etc. Public funding should be used to improve such processes and 
teacher quality. 
 Another suggestion to improve quality is to replace the current state diploma all 
graduates receive with a university diploma. 
 Reducing dropout is regarded important, though the rates are not high in the more 
prestigious institutions. Most students appear to drop out because of academic 
underperformance, some move to other regions in the country and some drop out due 
to financial reasons (OECD, 2014). 
 More problematic is the fact that quite some high potential Kazakhstani students go 
study abroad if they can afford to do so. It is argued by several respondents of 
Kazakhstani universities that higher education abroad often is regarded of higher 
quality, such as in Russia and China. Also the representatives of the Ministry of 
Education expressed their disappointment about substantial outbound academic 
migration of Kazakhstani students. 
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 The employability of graduates is regarded to be an interesting and good indicator to 
achieve a competitive higher education system, however, the way it is measured 
currently is not regarded valid by many stakeholders. 
 Only very few universities explicitly stress their efforts to enhance personal values 
and spirituality as primary tasks of higher education. 
 Linking higher education, science and innovation is aimed at, but appears to be only 
possible for the strong research universities. 
 The high prestigious Joint-Stock Companies (JSC) and private universities are able 
to closely link to industry and employers. They organise feedback from businesses 
on the type of graduates needed and organise various interactions through 
internships, business incubators, spin-offs, career centres, joint programmes, dual 
education, employer satisfaction surveys, co-working centres, etc. 
 Higher education does educate good quality graduates enhancing the competitiveness 
of the economy. However, many graduates go work in other sectors as they were 
trained for (e.g. teachers) and most graduates want to work outside the higher 
education sector as this provides them better salaries. 
 
2.4.2. The operation of the State Grant System 
 
Regarding the main public funding mechanism, the State Grants System, the interviews 
demonstrated many interesting observations: 
 In general, most stakeholders are to a large extent satisfied with the current funding 
model through the State Grants, though many interviewees stress that the amount of 
money allocated per student is regarded too low for providing good quality 
education. 
 There is a general impression that the number of State Grants is too low to guarantee 
access to higher education. 
 Quite a number of institutions that have only a limited proportion of State Grant 
students are fine with that situation. They want to have the prestige of enrolling State 
Grant students. Based on that, they can attract many students who are prepared to 
pay even higher fees for high quality education. 
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 The distribution of State Grants over the institutions and programmes is related to the 
number of students and graduates, the proportion of graduates employed after 
graduation, qualifications of staff, the number of students winning awards and the 
grades of students. Various stakeholders doubt about the reliability of such statistics 
(there is a need for better and more transparent data and data bases with key statistics 
on Kazakhstan’s HE sector). 
 The distribution of State Grants varies considerably between institutions and 
programmes. There are no serious complaints about (un)fairness in numbers of State 
Grants awarded. Only few argue that a fully open voucher system could create 
stronger competition and a more fair distribution of State Grants. 
 The differentiation in State Grant tariffs between the national universities (high tariff 
of 640,000 tenge against 348,000 tenge is somehow accepted in the system, though 
many argue that the high tariff, and related higher remuneration of staff in national 
universities does not reflect the difference in the quality of teaching. Only few (low 
tariff) universities complain about the high difference between the two tariffs. 
Particularly State Universities argue that the lower tariff of State Grants do hardly 
cover the costs of education, particularly if the quality of education is supposed to 
increase. 
 Related to the previous issue, there appears to be a need to calculate the (real) costs 
of education (per programme and/or institution). This will definitely require intensive 
consultations between ministries, statistical offices and representatives of universities 
on how the costs of education can be calculated. 
 Because the State Grants are awarded to students on the basis of their UNT scores, 
this implies that the universities hosting State Grant students attract (very) good 
students who are less likely to drop out. However, UNT scores are not a guarantee to 
success, some students failed the test due to an off-day and the most talented students 
are not always the most hard working students and can also drop out. 
 High scoring UNT students, receiving the State Grants are most likely to attend 
national universities in Astana or Almaty, which leaves universities in other regions 
with lower quality students.  
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2.4.3. The role of tuition fees 
 
Regarding the dominant role of tuition fees in Kazakhstan’s higher education, the 
following observations can be made: 
 The national and state universities feel a strong push towards tuition-based 
education. There is felt a very high emphasis on full-tuition paying students. This 
may decrease the quality of education. 
 The fact that tuition fees at universities receiving State Grants cannot be lower than 
the amount of the State Grant, feel that they miss out on a number of potential 
students who cannot afford to pay the current tuition levels. 
 Some fully private universities charge relatively low tuition fees (170,000 – 190,000 
tenge). Others fear this harms the general impression about the quality of higher 
education and that it is “unfair” competition. 
 The good and mostly private universities attracting only a limited number of State 
Grant students are happy to demonstrate their quality in this way but charge higher 
tuition fees from self-paying students. They have a high tuition – high expectations 
strategy, demanding additional selection criteria such as English proficiency, 
motivation letters, entrepreneurial attitude. 
 
2.4.4. Resource diversification 
 
Regarding the general expectation that the resource diversification at universities should 
be improved, the following observations were made: 
 The main source of resource diversification is for tuition revenues. Very good 
universities raise tuition levels to cross subsidise other activities, such as internships, 
scholarships for poor but high achieving students, external accreditations, more PhD 
research, etc. This is not possible for most universities. 
 Only a few institutions are successful in attracting some “grants and scholarships” 
from other entities like local authorities or companies. Only a few local authorities 
take up this issue as a public task, but it is generally dependent on the city major or 
other high official. 
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 The number of IPR’s at most institutions is regarded very low or absent leading to 
hardly any patenting revenues. 
 Currently hardly any university has been able to establish endowment funds. Only 
the more prestigious universities have just started to set up their own endowment 
fund to which alumni and sponsors contribute. 
 More technology, medically and law oriented institutions or programmes are better 
capable of attracting contract income through commissioned research and services. 
 However, in general developing more entrepreneurial activities are regarded as very 
difficult, as one cannot rent out “public facilities” unless all revenues go to the 
government, one cannot develop contract teaching services; , 
 Research funds through the national competitive research funds are welcomed, but in 
many cases also regarded as limited in terms of numbers and amounts, just covering 
the additional staffing costs. Only strong universities that collaborate with the 
Research Institutes appear to be more successful in attracting public research 
funding. 
 The strong ministerial push to fund all infrastructure by increasing tuition revenues 
or donations from donors is received with skepticism as these in most cases are hard 
to accomplish. Maybe the successful cases to diversify resources have to be better 
used as “good practice examples”. 
 The Ministry appears to be more optimistic about the capacity to generate revenues 
from companies than universities. 
 Not many universities have positive experiences with the 1% tax levied to companies 
to provide additional “grants” to students. It is nice when it happens, but is unstable 
funding which cannot be used for reliable budgeting. 
2.4.5. The level of financial autonomy 
 
Regarding the autonomy of universities, the study shows a few clear messages: 
 Fully private institutions have full autonomy about their spending behaviour, but 
those receiving State Grants are overly regulated and often feel having little 
autonomy. This is in line with national experts’ studies which claims that 
Kazakhstani universities may have substantial autonomy related to staff 
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management, but less so concerning academic issues and finances (Sagintayeva & 
Kurakbayev, 2015; Information Analytical Centre, 2014).   
 There is a general feeling among many of the respondents that the already tight 
public budgets allocated to universities are governed by various bureaucratic rules 
and procedures that seriously limit financial autonomy and institutional efficiency 
and effectiveness. There are too many regulations about how to spend public funds:  
o such as the requirement to have one teacher for every 8 students 
o the rule that universities always have to take the cheapest offer in public 
procurements (even if delivery of goods/services takes place way later) 
o not being able to develop contract teaching, 
o not being allowed to rent out facilities or if that happens to transfer all benefits to 
the state, etc. 
 Regulations are perceived to be stimulating compliance rather than a focus on 
performance and outcomes. They also do not stimulate efficiency  
 To stimulate high quality teaching and research, universities should be given more 
financial and governance autonomy to set higher standards for quality, to appoint 
good professional teams, use international experts, to establish new study 
programmes, etc. 
 The national procurement regulations are found to be very limiting as they only focus 
on the lowest-price offer rather than on quality. The administrative procedures for 
investments also are regarded lengthy and limiting. 
 Though many institutions appear to be satisfied with the public subsidies for 
infrastructures, they would prefer an annual budget to better plan maintenance and 
renovations according to what is needed. 
 In order to strongly focus on high quality education, there appears to be a need for 
more persons with good managerial competencies, both at central leadership level as 
well at faculty level. 
 
2.4.6. Performance incentives in the system 
 
Regarding incentives in the current funding system the following observations can be 
made:  
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 In general the level of performance orientation is regarded low. The focus of 
government policies is perceived to be much more on inputs than on outputs, 
outcomes and quality. 
 Most representatives feel that the State Grant system leads to good quality students, 
however, the full-fee paying parts feel challenges by the need for revenues and the 
level of students they get in. 
 Only the high-tuition private institutions can afford to really focus on high quality 
services through offering good facilities and inspiring and challenging learning 
environments. They can afford to take relatively rigorous measures to combat 
cheating and academic fraud like plagiarism.  
2.4.7. Student financial support 
 
Regarding student financial support the following main observations can be made:  
 The student loans system is not yet regarded a good instrument. Students do not like 
to take up the loans. They also somehow manage to pay for the tuition costs. 
 Private universities attracting students that perform in the lower range fear that 
higher tuition fees will go at the expense of the number of students that can afford to 
enroll, unless the student loans will get more favourable repayment conditions. 
 Few good (private) universities have made an individual arrangement with private 
banks to provide student loans with more favourable conditions (e.g. 5% interest 
instead of 13%). 
 Representatives do not mention the family savings plans (need for wider 
communication). 
 A few high tuition institutions can afford to apply their own scholarship programme 
that waives (part of the) tuition fees of 5% to 10% of their students. 
2.5. The way forward for higher education in Kazakhstan 
 
Based on the analyses presented above, the study aims to propose a number of options 
that provide some food for thought for Kazakhstan’s higher education policy makers to 
further enhance the future sustainability of the higher education system. It is not the 
ambition to provide a full-fledged funding model that provides the solution to all 
challenges that Kazakhstan’s higher education currently faces. Here we rather provide 
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an overview of funding options that may help promote the key strategic objectives of 
Kazakhstan’s higher education and that may address some of the key challenges 
regarding the current funding model. 
 
Based on the key strategic objectives of Kazakhstan’s higher education as formulated in 
the State Program for Education and Science Development (SPESD) 2016-2019 (see 
section 3.2) as well as the various stakeholder perspectives and perceptions on the 
strategic objectives expressed in the interviews, we summarize the strategic objectives 
of Kazakhstan’s higher education into the following five key priority areas: 
 
1. Strengthening the quality and performance of teaching 
2. Providing highly trained graduates relevant for the labour market 
3. Strengthening scientific research and its societal impact 
4. Strengthening the management and monitoring of higher education and science 
 
In the next sections we formulate a number of potential directions for the further 
development of Kazakhstan’s higher education and how this can be supported by 
funding arrangements. For each of the key priority areas we will address to what extent 
the current funding model is achieving the objectives or not. In addition to that, we will 
discuss to what extent the criteria for “good funding models” apply, such as stability, 
performance orientation and innovation orientation. Based on that we will identify some 
potential ways of improvement. Finally, these ideas will be illustrated with a few 
international good practice examples that will serve as food for thought. Many of these 
good practice examples have been published in a World Bank report by Arnhold et alia 
(2014). Any changes in the current funding model or introduction of new funding 
instruments remain an issue of political decision making in Kazakhstan’s higher 
education system, which has to take into account the national and local context, 
traditions and possibilities.  
2.5.1. Strengthening the quality and performance of teaching 
 
The quality of teaching and learning is key to the further development of higher 
education in Kazakhstan. Though it is not mentioned specifically as a strategic objective 
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in the SPESD, it resonates in many of the sub-goals as well as in the interviews with 
many stakeholders. 
 
Role of the current funding model in stimulating quality and performance 
 
As various stakeholders stated, the current State Grants system – which is the main 
allocation model for teaching funds – is primarily awarded to students with relatively  
high scores in the Unified National Test. This implies that the most promising students 
are being funded and thus guaranteeing that the most promising students are enrolling in 
higher education. As higher education is an experience good – which combines the 
efforts, capacities and experiences of teachers and the students (Vossensteyn and 
Jongbloed, 2007) – the State Grant funding model ensures that the better prepared 
students will attend higher education and come to good quality teaching.  
 
However, the State Grants are not only awarded to the best students, but also distributed 
according to certain allocation mechanisms to disciplines and institutions. This actually 
implies that there are certain quota for the various disciplines, and students who are very 
good, but would like to enroll into a programme that is favoured by many even better 
students, may have to enroll in a less favoured study programme and thus be less 
motivated and having a higher likelihood to drop out. In addition, only 27% of all 
students are supported by the State Grants. This implies that study programmes also 
enrol full-fee paying students that have (substantially) lower UNT scores and thus may 
reduce the quality of the educational experience. Of course, the proportion of state-
granted students varies strongly by institution and by programme. 
 
Another major issue concerns the fact that the State Grants System does not really relate 
to the quality of teaching, it is about the quality of the student at the moment she or he 
takes the UNT. This test is also challenged, because it is said to be only a one-moment 
snapshot and particularly tests memorising, rather than academic competences such as 
understanding, applying and generating knowledge (Winter et al., 2014). 
 
A further issue relates to the different tariffs applied for national universities versus 
stage and JSC universities. Though the tariff for the national universities is almost 
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double the one for the other state subsidised institutions, it is questioned whether this 
also implies that the quality is twice as high, because teacher qualifications and salaries 
are higher. At the moment the rationale is not very transparent and could be improved. 
It is also unclear how the tariffs relate to the real costs of education. Most institutions 
say the tariffs cover only a bare minimum of expenses, while some real private 
universities can do with substantially lower tuition fees. 
 
Furthermore, the system relies heavily on tuition fees, 73% of the students are full-fee 
paying students. As the student population is a substantial proportion of the youth – 
demonstrating a good higher education participation ratio for Kazakhstan – the tuition 
driven system does not lead to an elite system. Regardless of equity of access issues, 
still many students can find their way into the system in one way or another. 
 
In terms of teaching quality, this heavy reliance on tuition fees has a few implications. 
First of all, as many students have to pay the full costs, one can imagine that they find it 
worth to invest and they will collectively demand value for money, pressing universities 
to good quality education. In addition, because students pay the “full price”, they may 
try to graduate as fast as possible and thus put in a lot of effort. Another vision can be 
that the need for so many full-fee paying students pushes institutions to offer education 
at the lowest costs possible and thus compromising on quality in order to keep it 
affordable and attractive for many potential students. Day-to-day practice shows both 
sides of the coin: some private institutions running universities against the bare 
minimum costs and lowest tuition fees possible and those more prestigious institutions 
charging higher fees for better quality services. And some universities taking a middle 
position. 
 
Student loans and family savings plans are available to all students and their families. 
But due to the unfavourable conditions, only very few students take up the loans and 
few families invest in the savings plans. If Kazakhstan really wants to support its 
students, somehow the tight conditions should be relaxed. 
 
In general terms, the heavy reliance on tuition fees made Kazakhstan’s higher education 
system a strongly market-driven system. If the government wants to steer towards 
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quality, it may have to come from setting minimum levels for tuition fees and 
particularly strict quality assurance regulations. 
 
Stability, performance and innovation orientation 
 
Stability: The State Grant system is already in place quite for some time and as such 
appears to be a stable factor in the higher education system and – regardless of the felt 
unfairness of the two-tariff structure and allocation over universities – appears to be 
well accepted. The universities more or less know what they get and are used to further 
develop their universities by enrolling full-fee paying students. 
 
The number of State Grants per institution and programme can vary between years if the 
number of students changes and the employability of graduates changes. Because this is 
not a fully transparent system and we did not notice major fluctuations being reported, it 
appears that the distribution of State Grants among the disciplines and institutions is a 
bit of a stabilising factor. In this respect the self-reporting system on the employability 
of graduates appears to be a bit odd as they are having a big interest in demonstrating 
good performance. 
 
The heavy reliance on tuition fees has demonstrated that all universities are relatively 
good at recruiting full-fee paying students and as such created themselves a semi- stable 
source of revenues. But this remains hard working and there will definitely be 
substantial fluctuations between institutions and programmes. Particularly if the 
demographic situation becomes more tight. 
 
Performance: The State Grants system only rewards the good performing students and 
programmes that have relatively good employability scores among its graduates. It does 
not strongly encourage institutions to reduce dropout, to offer modern teaching 
methods, to employ good teachers (though it is required for receiving State Grants that 
the institution has well qualified academics with Master’s or PhD degrees, this does not 
mean they are good teachers) or to have curricula that meet international accreditation 
standards. The State Grants system also does not encourage the institutions to help 
students graduate. The heavy reliance on tuition fees does stimulate institutions to offer 
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programmes that students are willing to invest in. But only the best funded national 
universities and the high cost prestigious private or JSC universities appear to really 
focus on high quality relevant teaching in order to become even better and charge higher 
tuition fees. 
 
Though the Student Grants system is sometimes compared to a voucher system in which 
the money follows the student and where students determine where they spend their 
vouchers, in the State Grants system the freedom of choice of the students is very much 
limited by the allocation of State Grants over disciplines and institutions. In that respect, 
the transition towards a real system of vouchers or learning entitlements could increase 
competition between students and institutions (Vossensteyn and Jongbloed, 2007; 
Hillman et al., 2014). 
 
Innovation: None of the funding instruments appears to include any incentives to offer 
modern innovative teaching methods and infrastructure. It is predominantly the intrinsic 
motivation of some universities to seriously work towards becoming an innovative 
teaching institution. The public budget does not reserve any of its funding for 
supporting innovations or for the professionalization of staff.  
Potential areas of improvement 
Based on the observations formulated above there are various areas of improvement if 
the Kazakhstani government would like to stronger focus its public funding toward the 
improvement of the quality of teaching and learning. 
 
If it is the aim to allocate funds through the students, e.g. by means of vouchers, one 
could increase the competition among students and institutions by reducing the role of 
the quotas of State Grants per institution and discipline or programme and leave it more 
to the decisions of the best UNT scoring students. One way would be to further develop 
the current State Grants system into a fully competitive voucher system. This would 
tackle the current perceived problem of intransparency of the institution and programme 
–based quotas for the allocating of the State Grants to students, which for example is 
indicated by the national experts consulted in the Roadmap project, as well as 
representatives of various higher education institutions. Below, in the international good 
practices section, we will elaborate further on voucher models and the example of 
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Colorado (Hillman et al., 2014). However, the competition among higher education 
institutions for students is already guaranteed to a large extent by the high proportion of 
full-fee paying students. 
 
A second way to introduce a quality impulse to the system would be to integrate 
quality-oriented criteria into the funding provided to higher education and particularly 
incentivise universities to work towards quality (de Boer et al., 2015). There are various 
ways in which this is pursued in various countries, e.g. through performance-based 
funding formulas, performance contracts or capacity-based funding. This would imply 
for  Kazakhstan’s higher education system to move away from the State Grants systems 
that to some extent makes funding follow the student, towards a mechanism that 
allocates the public funds more directly to the institutions on the basis of their 
performances, such as the number of graduates, the credits passed, the number of 
students, reducing dropout, implementing innovative teaching methods, the proportion 
of certified teaching staff, achieving high ranked international accreditations, etc. 
Performance-based funding formula and performance contracts have the advantage that 
it is transparent in the whole system what behaviour and performances are awarded. In 
addition, one can differentiate in the level of funding given to different disciplines 
(Deen et al., 2005), or – what currently happens in Kazakhstan’s higher education – 
between different types of institutions. Such differences in funding tariffs often 
resemble different cost structures, e.g. between medicine, engineering, science, social 
sciences and humanities. For example, it is more expensive to teach small groups in 
laboratories then lecturing for larger audiences in “mass lectures”. Below, in the 
international good practices section, we will further explore a few examples of such 
models. 
 
Finally, because in Kazakhstan only 27% of students are fully subsidised by the 
government and all others are used to pay the full cost, one can conclude that – 
regardless of public statements on “free higher education” – paying for higher education 
appears to be well accepted in Kazakhstan. The 27% that receive full subsidies are the 
highest achieving students. International literature shows that these often are students 
from relatively well-educated and well-off families that can afford to pay for higher 
education (Canning et al., forthcoming; Vossensteyn et al., 2013). Then the question is 
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why not consider a funding mechanism that requires all students to pay for higher 
education and spend all public subsidies for issues that are deemed important. This frees 
up budget for: 
 
 Subsidising talented but needy students 
 Providing well performing universities some level of basic funding 
 Provide some scholarships to high achieving students 
 Provide budgets for teaching innovations 
 Provide budget for highly accredited study programmes 
 Provide funding for internationalisation 
 Provide funding for improves employability scores 
International good practice examples 
 
Here we will briefly discuss a number of international examples of funding models and 
instruments that try to address teaching performance and quality. Next to the discussion 
on the principles of the instruments, some practical country specific examples will be 
presented (based on the existing literature) and translated in terms of potential 
implications and applicability with regard to Kazakhstan’s higher education. All of 
these offer interesting perspectives to particularly on the State Grants system in 
Kazakhstan. 
 
Example 1 - Vouchers for higher education 
 
A first model to be discussed would be taking the current Kazakhstan’s State Grants 
system one level further towards a “real money-follows-student model”. This is often 
called a voucher model or a model based on learning entitlements (Vossensteyn and 
Jongbloed, 2007). In a pure voucher scheme, the student (consumer) receives a coupon 
(voucher) which represents a certain amount of money to be spent on education. The 
value of the voucher is related to some notion of the average per capita costs of (a 
specified amount of) education. When a student chooses for a specific university, the 
university redeems the value of the voucher(s) from the government (ministry). In this 
model universities can only acquire public means by attracting students and their 
vouchers. This implies universities have to compete for public funds and students are 
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encouraged to seek the provider that best satisfies their demands. In doing so they can 
choose from a range of providers, including public and private ones. To some extent 
this happens in Kazakhstan. The vouchers are the State Grants awarded to the best 
students in the UNT. In their search for the best match between the students’ interests 
and what is offered by the institutions, the students are limited by the different tariffs 
and quotas used for different types of universities (national, state, JSC and fully private 
institutions) and types of study programmes, e.g. by discipline. The crucial issue about 
vouchers is the freedom of choice for the students, cost awareness and the fact that the 
students “experience” that they have an influence on where the money goes 
(Vossensteyn and Jongbloed, 2007; Hillman et al., 2014). Those who support vouchers 
argue that this will make universities more student oriented and more efficient if 
offering education that students want and is rewarded in the labour market. Successful 
institutions will get more public subsidies and be able to further increase quality. In 
various cases, vouchers are also claimed to promote equal access as all students who 
qualify to enter higher education would receive a certain number of vouchers. 
Opponents of vouchers claim that they lead to popular fancy programmes that easily 
satisfy students’ desires rather than the high quality students and future employers need. 
In addition, students cannot be fully informed and institutions cannot be fully flexible. 
 
Example: Vouchers through the College Opportunity Fund in Colorado 
 
One example comes from Colorado (USA) where in 2004 the “College Opportunity 
Fund” was introduced (Hillman et al., 2014). This is a voucher-based model allocating 
state appropriations to students instead of to the institutions. This was supposed to 
increase efficiency and equal access. The share of average tuition being covered by the 
voucher (for all students) reduced from about 35% in 2005-2007 to about 20% in 2010. 
Hillman et al. (2014) show that the College Opportunity Fund led to some cost 
efficiencies, like a reduction of the cost per FTE student, a reduction of the costs per 
graduate and an increase in the number of graduates per 100 FTE students. However, 
access for disadvantaged students, like students from low-income families, African 
Americans and Hispanics decreased. Other examples can be found in Ohio (Hillman et 
al., 2014) or learning entitlements in Australia (see Vossensteyn and Jongbloed, 2007). 
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Translating this example to the situation in Kazakhstan, a stronger voucher-based 
funding system would lead to the following dilemmas. While only 27% of  
Kazakhstan’s students receive State Grants, awarding vouchers to all potential students 
would seriously increase the public budget for higher education if the value of the 
vouchers would equal the level of the current State Grants. One could also consider 
providing (many) more students with vouchers, but then – under current budget 
constraints – one would have to reduce the average value per voucher compared to the 
current State Grants. In the latter case, all students would have to “top-up” the vouchers 
and in fact pay tuition fees, even those whose tuition now is fully covered by the State 
Grants. Another dilemma would be the extent to which students would have the 
freedom to spend their vouchers wherever they like and could study any study 
programme at any higher education of their choice.  
 
Though increased freedom increases the level of competition in the system, it may also 
lead to larger numbers of students willing to spend their vouchers in the top-universities 
or on “relatively easy to complete” study programmes that do not immediately lead to 
employability. As such, a voucher system with strong freedom of choice for students 
would have to be accompanied with a strict quality assurance mechanism as well as 
clear and reliable information on employability. Furthermore, a voucher system also 
requires a reliable registration system in which universities as well as the government 
can easily track the number of vouchers used per student, at what tariff (e.g. if different 
tariffs are used for different disciplines) and how many have been spent at a particular 
university. As such, transferring to a full voucher system in higher education in 
Kazakhstan still requires a number of difficult decisions to take. If vouchers are used to 
stimulate equal access, this may require substantial additional investments in the 
Kazakhstan higher education system. However, opening up the opportunities of where 
and what to study with State Grants could bring a new dynamic to Kazakhstan's higher 
education with potentially changing positions between current universities and leading 
to some efficiencies and higher completion rates. 
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Example 2 - Funding formulas with competitive and performance oriented 
elements 
 
Many respondents interviewed in this study, including a number of institutions leaders, 
indicated to be basically satisfied with the current State Grants funding system as it 
brings them relative stability regarding their position in the system and regarding the 
level of public funding they receive. However, many respondents – including 
representatives from private, JSC and national universities – also commented that the 
current funding mechanism does not stimulate universities to improve the quality of 
teaching. Most of them also indicated that the quality of education really needs to be 
improved to match students’ and employers’ expectations and to stimulate international 
mobility. 
 
Many countries stimulate quality and educational performance by the application of 
funding formulas or performance contracts for teaching that include one or multiple 
competitive elements as drivers. For example, it is assumed that if universities receive 
public funds on the basis of the number of credits or degrees successfully obtained by 
students, that this stimulates universities to offer their education in such a way that 
students can successfully pass courses and programmes, or do so in a more efficient 
way. Institutions would reduce administrative obstacles, logistical problems and offer 
more attractive teaching methods to reduce dropout and increase study progress (De 
Boer et al., 2014). Regarding the current Kazakhstani system, this could bring new 
dynamics to the way universities are currently funded. Instead of a focus on negotiating 
with the Ministry about the State Grant quotas and attracting State Granted students, 
there would be a transparent allocation mechanism that directly funds universities based 
on performances that are deemed important in Kazakhstan’s higher education sector. 
 
In principle, a funding formula allocates public funding among universities on the basis 
of the efforts or performances they demonstrate. Thus, the amount of funding per 
institution depends on the relative share of the total number of “funded units” they 
deliver. The units can consist of the number of new entrants attracted, the number of 
students, the number of study credits obtained, the number of degrees conferred, the 
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number of international students, etc. Different countries use different indicators as 
achievements (Arnhold et al., 2014; de Boer et al., 2014). 
 
Example: Taximeter system in Denmark 
 
The first, more specific example on the use of a funding formula concerns Denmark 
where universities are funded to a large extent on the basis of the number of credits 
obtained by students. This is called the “taximeter system”. Because the Danish 
government wants to reward institutions for successful education activities and wants to 
stimulate public money following the user, all schools as well as universities and 
colleges are funded on the basis of “successfully completed study-
units”(Undervisningsministeriet, 2016). The taximeter system was introduced in 1994 
and has been revised several times since then. An important feature is that HE 
institutions do not receive compensation for students who fail or do not take exams. The 
taximeter scheme aims to promote completion rates. In 2004, the formula based on 
passed credits was complemented with a completion bonus for each student that 
completed a Bachelor programme. In 2009, a new completion bonus was introduced 
which is conditional upon the duration of studies: universities are paid the completion 
bonus only for students who obtain a degree within a limited time period (for bachelors 
this is the nominal duration + 1 year and for masters the nominal duration of studies). A 
further development will be a “completion-agreement”. By 2020, it is expected that if 
students do not complete their studies on time, the universities will lose a substantial 
amount of money (de Boer et al., 2014). In 2014, 91% of the taximeter funding 
depended on the relative number of passed exams and 9% on the completion bonus.  
The taximeter tariffs vary by groups of disciplines: per package of 60 Credits (one FTE 
year of study) a university receives €13.000 for natural, health and technical sciences, 
€6.000 for social sciences and humanities, and € 9.000 for “combinations”. 
 
The Danish taximeter system is particularly an interesting example in view of the ideas 
expressed by the Kazakhstani Ministry of Education and Science to seriously consider a 
credit-based funding system as a replacement of the State Grants system. Particularly 
interesting in a credit-based system is the fact that it is more flexible in rewarding  
smaller teaching efforts and achievements. It may also be easier to transfer credit 
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funding from one student to another, or from one university to another. Like in the State 
Grants system, credit-based funding generally is a financial transfer from the 
government to the university, not to the student. In an “open-end system” – where 
universities would get funding for each completed study credit – universities would 
receive the incentive to produce as many credits as possible. As such – like a voucher 
system – also a credit-based system needs a carful design in which students and 
universities get the right incentives towards high quality education and efficiency. 
Again, clear “rules of the game” for students and universities are required as well as 
strict quality assurance regulations. 
 
Example: Simple performance formula in the Netherlands 
 
Since 1998, Dutch universities and universities of applied sciences are funded for their 
teaching services on the basis of the number of new entrants, students and graduates. 
Though graduate numbers determined 50% of the funding, due to complaints about an 
overemphasis on completions, the formula was changed in 2011. Since then, Dutch 
higher education institutions are funded on the basis of two parts: one part related to the 
number of students and degrees conferred and one called “education provision”. The 
first one is a formula, the second one is a strategic allocation including performance 
contracts.  
 
The funding formula in Dutch higher education addresses about 65% of the teaching 
budget and is relatively simple. It includes the number of students and degrees 
conferred: This part of the funding, which defines 65% of the teaching budget, is the 
product of a weighted student price and weighted number of enrolments (within the 
nominal duration of a program) and diplomas. The weighted student price is determined 
as the total budget divided by the total number of weighted enrolments and diplomas. 
The weights are 1, 1.5, and 3 for low, high, and top studies—humanities & social 
sciences, science & engineering, and medicine respectively. These weights are the same 
for bachelor and master students. 
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Example: Complex integrated performance formula in Finland 
 
In Finland, the funding model consists of a funding formula that integrates teaching and 
research and includes various elements that capture quality and performance issues.  
Such a system creates a lot of dynamics due to the wide range of indicators and criteria 
used. It demonstrates different weights given to various priorities, such as teaching, 
research and valorisation, and within those areas to completed degrees, credits, 
internationalisation and strategic development. The figure below presents the Finnish 
university funding model. Within the different indicator areas, various weights can be 
given to different disciplines. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Finnish university funding model (Halonen, 2014) 
 
An interesting phenomenon from the performance-oriented funding formulas is that 
they generally include different tariffs for performances in different disciplinary sectors, 
like medicine, engineering, science, social science, humanities and arts. In general, such 
tariff differences relate to the assumed differences in costs between disciplines due to 
differences in instruction models, group-size, required support staff, equipment, 
infrastructure, etc. (Deen et al., 2005; JM Consulting and PA Consulting, 2005). 
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Related to the situation in Kazakhstan this is an interesting result. During the 
stakeholder interviews in Kazakhstan’s higher education sector, the cost differences 
were argued to be assigned to differences in types of universities that employ staff with 
different qualification levels and therefore require different salary levels, and to a 
stronger research focus in the more prestigious institutions. In the Kazakhstani debate, 
cost differences between disciplines appear to be less prominent. As the funding tariffs 
of State Grants in the more prestigious national universities are almost twice as high as 
in the other types of universities, one would assume the quality to be substantially 
higher. The latter was less supported during the interviews: “Even if the State Grants are 
almost double the amount, one cannot expect the quality of the graduates to be twice as 
high. In the end, both institutions award similar state diplomas and degrees”. “If 
teachers at national universities earn better salaries due to higher qualifications than 
teachers in other universities, that does not mean that students learn equally more in 
national universities”. Such issues call for a closer analysis of the cost differences in 
Kazakhstan’s higher education system, not only looking for differences between types 
of academic institutions, but also between various disciplines.  
 
The international comparative study by Deen et al. (2005), as well as examples in the 
UK (JM Consulting and PA Consulting, 2005) and in New Zealand demonstrate that 
some countries opt for a very differentiated tariff structure across many disciplines, 
while some other countries try to reduce complexity by discerning only a very few 
funding tariffs. However, for reasons of transparency and efficient use of public 
funding, stronger knowledge about the costs of teaching students in different types of 
institutions and disciplines would be recommendable. During the interviews of the 
Roadmap project, respondents of both the Ministry of Education and Science and some 
universities have called for such an analysis.  As it proves to be very difficult to identify 
the relationship between teaching and research – particularly expressed in monetary 
terms – most countries explicitly differentiate between the funding for teaching and 
research. Even in the integrated funding formula in Finland, teaching and research 
funding are explicitly separated. 
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Example 3 - Performance agreements 
 
Performance agreements are contracts between the government and individual higher 
education institutions, which set out specific goals that institutions will seek to achieve 
in a given time period (de Boer et al., 2014). They specify the intentions to accomplish 
particular targets to be measured against previously defined standards. The 
performances deemed to be fulfilled are laid down in a contract which also specifies the 
rewards upon achievement of the agreed performances or the penalty in case of non-
achievement. Such performance agreements can be titled differently in various 
countries, such as compacts (Australia, Ireland), target agreements (some German 
states), outcome agreements (Scotland) or development plans (Hong Kong, Denmark). 
Some performance agreements particularly prescribe a certain outcome (a result that is 
to be achieved), others the effort an actor reasonably has to make (a level of effort an 
actor is capable of making). This is also called the distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
agreements. 
 
The next issue in performance agreements concerns the question what counts as a 
performance. Can the attraction of international students or employability of graduates 
be attributed to an institution? Is maintaining minimal quality standards a performance 
or core activity? De Boer et al. (2014) argue that performances are goal- or problem-
oriented, results-based and measured against pre-set standards. These standards can be 
the result of a political decision, a negotiation process among stakeholders, or a 
benchmark against the performance of other institutions on the same indicators. 
Contract partners can also agree to focus on certain activities (i.e. make a serious effort) 
with the aim to accomplish particular goals, like the establishment of new study 
programmes, the implementation of professionalization courses for teachers, or setting 
up of new teaching methodologies, e.g. with a focus on entrepreneurship. A final aspect 
of performance agreements is whether or not they are tied to (public) funding. If there is 
no funding linked to the agreements made between the government and the institutions, 
one could speak of ‘letters of intent’ such as in Denmark, Germany and Australia). In 
countries where performance agreements have direct financial consequences, one can 
speak of performance contracts, such as in Austria, Ireland, Finland and the 
Netherlands). 
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Though performance agreements may seem to be a complete different way of funding 
higher education than the current State Grants system, they may form an interesting 
option to at least analyse and consider in Kazakhstan as performance agreements can 
help steer the system in the directions expressed in the State Program for Education and 
Science Development (SPESD) 2016-2019. More individualised performance 
agreements are often meant to help institutions focus on their strengths in relation to 
national strategic priorities. As such, the government can legitimately differentiate 
between (types of) institutions, in terms of tasks, responsibilities, areas of expertise and 
expected performance. Performance agreements can be used relatively flexible in terms 
of objectives, envisaged targets and time span. They can address teaching, research, 
quality, internationalization, innovations, study success, dropout, etc. and be determined 
annually or for 3-5 years. Performance agreements often determine only part of the 
public funding (de Boer et al., 2014). For example, in Hong Kong 10% of funding 
allocated through the Performance and Role-related Funding Scheme and in the 
Netherlands 7% of teaching funds is based on quality-oriented performance agreements 
about progression in completion rates, didactical qualifications of teachers, student 
satisfaction, etc. In countries such as Australia, Denmark, Germany, New Zealand and 
Scotland, the performance agreements are particularly used as an instrument in addition 
to performance based funding formulas (de Boer et al., 2014). 
 
Example 4 - General tuition fees 
 
Another alternative to boost quality in Kazakhstan’s’ higher education is to consider the 
option of charging tuition fees to all students. Next to stimulating equity of access 
(Canning et al., forthcoming) this could increase the current funding level in 
Kazakhstan’s higher education. Of course it can be questioned whether Kazakhstan’s 
policy makers and politicians would be willing to give up the idea of “free higher 
education” to those students who pass the UNT with the highest scores,. However, due 
to the fact that 73% of all Kazakhstani higher education students have to pay full tuition 
costs – either at private or public universities – one can no longer speak of “free higher 
education”. Not only does the European Commission (2011) stimulate countries to 
implement some level of tuition fees to increase the revenue base for universities and to 
stimulate equal access, also many countries in practice have implemented or increased 
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tuition fees for regular students, such as in Austria, Ireland, England, the Netherlands 
and Germany (Vossensteyn et al., 2013). As long as governments do not reduce public 
spending when tuition fees are generally implemented or increased, this provides 
universities with additional revenues that can be invested amongst other things in the 
quality of teaching, infrastructure, staff development, innovations and research. The 
introduction of tuition fees in various German Länder in the 2007-2010 period helped to 
improve teaching infrastructures considerably. However, cancelling tuition fees a few 
years later without a full compensation of public resources, demonstrated that such 
revenues boosted education quality. Losing these revenues implies universities have to 
substantially cut costs again. Though in the Kazakhstani context general tuition fees 
may be a sensitive political issue, not analysing its merits and disadvantages may not be 
doing justice to all students who have to pay the full price of studying. Thus, being 
more open about the political and practical reasons behind the tuition policies creates an 
atmosphere of transparency on the system. 
 
Example 5 - Link student loans to performance 
 
Another model to stimulate student performance can be to differentiate repayment 
condition between students. Currently, many stakeholders during the interviews for the 
Roadmap project indicated that the borrowing conditions of current student loans are 
unfavourable in Kazakhstan and prevent students who may need the loans from taking 
them. In order to make the official student loans offered in Kazakhstan more attractive, 
one could for example waive part of the student loan debt accumulated by students if 
they belong to the (20%) best performing graduates or if they graduate within the 
nominal duration of studies. This practice is, for example, being applied in the German 
BAFöG loans and the Estonian student loans (Vossensteyn et al., 2013; Arnhold et al., 
2014). This of course implies an extra financial risk for the government of Kazakhstan 
who guarantees the loans. But currently, the loans system anyhow appears to suffer 
from a high default rate leading to indirect subsidies to students (Canning et al., 
forthcoming). One can better use such subsidies to positively attract students to the loan 
facility. 
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2.5.2. Providing highly trained graduates relevant for the labour market 
 
Providing highly trained graduates and specialists that can work in and further develop 
the Kazakhstani labour market and help making the economy more competitive is a key 
strategic objective of Kazakhstan’s higher education. This not only implies that students 
should be educated at a high level, but also that graduates have the relevant knowledge 
and skills to effectively operate in the Kazakhstani economy. This can become visible if 
many graduates find a job – or start their own businesses – that matches their level and 
domain of expertise. As such, the employability should be high and the number of 
graduates should satisfy the needs of the labour market. 
 
Role of the current funding model in stimulating employability 
 
The current funding model for teaching – the State Grants System – is to a substantial 
extent tuned to the needs of the labour market. One of the key factors that determines 
the allocation of State Grant quotas over the universities and disciplinary study 
programmes is by the rate of employability of the graduates. Thus, if the graduates of a 
certain study programme more often find a job after graduation, then it is very likely 
that the programme may get allocated more State Grant study places in the years to 
follow. The employment rated is assumed to be a predictor of relevance and 
employability. This appears to be a sound way of reasoning. 
 
During the stakeholder interviews, it became clear that the proportion of graduates is not 
yet a good indicator for the question whether graduates find a job that matches their 
level and expertise and whether the competences of the graduates match with the needs 
within their employment domains. Various stakeholders indicated that “substantial 
numbers of graduates find employment in very different sectors as to what  they were 
trained for, like graduates becoming taxi drivers, engineers not going into an 
engineering job”. “Many teachers do not want to become low paid teachers but after 
graduation often find much better paid jobs in the oil- and gas industry or service sector. 
This leads to a situation where it is difficult to find good teachers at schools.” Though 
international practice shows that in any system, a substantial number of graduates find 
employment outside their area of expertise and/or at a lower level as what they would 
54 
 
be capable of, the situation in Kazakhstan is perceived to be problematic as reported by 
the interviewees. 
 
A related issue concerns the type of information that is used for measuring 
employability. At the moment the universities themselves have to report on the 
proportion of their graduates being employed. This self-reporting mechanism may be 
tempting institutions to be a bit subjective and positive in their calculations as they have 
a strong interest to demonstrate good figures. This may result in more State Granted 
students in the years to come.  
 
Another issue concerns the tax levy of 1% on company profits. These are predominantly 
used to offer additional grants (subsidised study places). The study places subsidised in 
this way are negotiated between local/regional authorities, universities and the 
“sponsoring” companies. As such, this stimulates that universities produce graduates 
that are relevant to the companies involved. During the interviews it was also expressed 
that in some cases the students subsidised in this way are expected to work for the 
respective companies for some years after graduation. 
 
Finally, student financial support in the form of student loans and family savings plans 
is not directly stimulating students to graduate or rewarding employability. Indirectly, 
borrowing for higher education puts a financial pressure on students and graduates with 
a study debt to perform well and find a suitable job with good salary condition to be 
able to repay the debt. On the other hand, students who need the loans because of 
financial austerity may be more likely to drop out for financial reasons. In addition, 
finding well-paying jobs appears to be more important than jobs that match the 
expertise of graduates, as such many trained teachers are said to seek employment in the 
private sector where the earnings are higher than if they would become a school teacher 
or go into academia. 
 
Stability, performance and innovation orientation 
 
Stability: From a stability perspective, allocating the State Grants partially on the basis 
of the employability of graduates looks relatively fine as one can imagine that the labour 
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market developments do not happen overnight. Labour dynamics happen on a 
permanent basis and mostly show a gradual development, unless technological 
innovations stimulate a rapid expansion of certain sector, like the ICT sector in the 
1990s. As such, using the employment rate of graduates for allocating the State Grants 
will make the higher education system dynamic in a gradual way. However, as only 
27% of the students study on a State Grant study place, the State Grants can only 
stabilise and dynamise a quarter of the higher education system. Other dynamics may 
rule the behaviour of all other students who pay full tuition fees, like the popularity or 
level of difficulty of a study programme and/or an institution. 
 
Performance: The fact that the allocation of State Grants partially happens on the basis 
of employment rates is rather unique, progressive and performance oriented. It links 
university funding the outcomes of higher education: success at the labour market. Not 
many countries dared to take that step yet. Nevertheless, as indicated above, this is a 
first step as it would be more directive if the performance incentive towards 
employability would reckon with type of jobs graduates find, like also indicating the 
level of employment and the sector of employment. Additionally one could think about 
graduate satisfaction and employer satisfaction scores. Another issue regarding 
performance in terms of producing relevant graduates is that the State Grants do not 
incentivise that students really graduate. The State Grants of students that drop out can 
be taken over by other students who before were not subsidised by the state. As 
explained above, the subsidised study places offered through the tax levy of 1% on 
company profits stimulates a close relationship between universities and the respective 
companies regarding the relevance of graduates. 
 
Innovation: Allocating the State Grants on the basis of employment data is particularly 
looking at past performance. However, as stated above, the labour market is in 
continuous change and there always appear new types of jobs. Think of IT specialists, 
quality assurance managers, internationalisation experts, etc. The current funding model 
does not challenge universities to develop new study programmes to educate the 
graduates for future new jobs. This may be addressed by the budgets available for 
graduate programmes, but the stakeholder interviews did not demonstrate that 
universities are invited, challenged or funded to think in that way. 
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Potential areas of improvement 
Regarding the stimulation of highly skilled graduates that meet the demands of 
Kazakhstan’s economy, the current system has taken steps to tune the funding 
mechanisms to employability. However, the way employability is measured can be 
improved, e.g. by refining the definitions towards employment at the right level and in a 
related field of expertise. Further steps could be taken by looking at the satisfaction of 
employers about the graduates they hire or the graduates about the competences they 
acquired. 
 
The use of the subsidised study places related to the 1% tax levy on company profits is a 
relatively new and still unclear area. These revenues are rather unstable and the rules on 
allocating such funds appear to be diverse and not well-known by most of the 
respondents. 
 
Regarding student financial support, if the government thinks on improving the 
repayment conditions of student loans, one alternative would be to provide interest 
subsidies or debt waivers in case graduates go work in publicly desired jobs or if they 
find employment in jobs that match their profile. 
 
International Good Practice Examples 
 
Regarding the stimulation of graduates, the main international practice is to organise 
public funding through funding formulas that encourage institutions to generate 
graduates and reduce dropout and graduates in the right domains. The first issue has 
been demonstrated in the example above on the performance oriented formula applied 
in the Netherlands (example 1). Steering towards sufficient numbers of graduates in 
particular types of disciplines and programmes can also be addressed by capacity 
funding as will be demonstrated in example 4 on capacity funding in Sweden.   
 
Capacity funding 
 
Next to the official statements about creating high quality professionals for the labour 
market as expressed in the State Programme for Education and Science Development 
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(SPESD) 2016-2019, also various stakeholders interviewed for the Roadmap project – 
including representatives of the MoES, national, state, JSC and private universities – 
indicated that employability should be an important element of higher education policy. 
The MoES and national universities stressed the need for a proper data collection of 
employability statistics on graduates that can better underpin the allocation of State 
Grants between disciplines, universities and study programmes. Prestigious private 
universities particularly stressed that universities should be in close contact to 
employers and intrinsically push for a continuous advancement in the competences they 
teach their students in order to make them better employable. This would also help to 
connect to business for other purposes, like sponsoring, doing collaborative research, 
providing scholarships for students, etc.  
 
One way of matching the allocation of public funds with the needs of the labour market 
is a model of capacity funding. In this option, the funding of teaching is (also) based on 
an agreed number of students, graduates, or successfully completed study credits in 
explicitly defined domains or study programmes.  Capacity funding could also include 
funding for new innovative study programmes that for example address newly emerging 
professions at the labour market, e.g. specialists in robotics. A key feature of capacity 
funding is that it funds a pre-defined capacity to produce a targeted number of 
graduates, students or credits in specified domains against proper quality. Under- or 
overproduction could be penalised. The current Kazakhstani State Grants system 
includes some elements of capacity funding as it partially agrees on the number of State 
Grants per institution and programme. However, it does not really reward successful 
studies but students who successfully passed the UNT, regardless of they successfully 
complete their bachelor or masters degrees or not. Below we will discuss the example of 
the capacity funding model that is applied in Sweden. This example has also been 
described in Arnhold et al., 2014 and is particularly based on a more elaborate 
description and analysis in De Boer et al. (2011). 
 
Example: Capacity funding in Sweden 
 
In Sweden, direct government funding, in terms of operational grants for education, 
takes the form of state block grants. The allocations are based on per capita amounts per 
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student (full-time equivalents or FTE) and the performances achieved by students. 
These amounts per student and per study result in different tariffs for different 
disciplines/study fields, as also discussed in the sections on performance formulas. The 
study performances are calculated in terms of annual performance equivalents for the 
students in terms of the numbers of credits obtained (1 FTE student = 60 EC). 
 
Every year the Parliament decides on the budget ceiling of each HEI, of which 30% is 
allocated based on performance. The HEI reports at the beginning of the fiscal year 
(January or February) how many FTE students and FTE study achievements they 
realized by December 31 of the previous fiscal year. In addition, the HEI’s monitor their 
student numbers and study achievements throughout the year, and based on the 
monitoring results, they report an intermediary estimate of their total budget required 
(shortages versus surpluses) three times per year. They also forecast this for the coming 
few years to enable longer term planning of the budgetary requirements for the coming 
3 years. 
 
The centrally determined funding cap per higher education institution is an absolute 
limit and therefore the Swedish funding mechanism can be regarded as capacity 
funding. Within the framework of the funding process, each HE institution engages 
annually in a dialogue with the Ministry of Education and Research. In this dialogue, 
each HEI agrees with the Ministry on its targets or aims in terms of realized student 
numbers and study achievements that will be rewarded. There is a maximum budget 
which constitutes the highest aggregate compensation of FTE students and annual 
performance equivalents permitted for the fiscal year. 
 
If an institution does not reach its funding ceiling because of fewer enrolled students 
and/or their performance outcomes not achieving agreed targets, it does not receive the 
full funding. If an institution enrols a greater number of students than indicated as the 
agreed ceiling amount, no additional compensation is paid. Thus, fluctuations in the 
number of students directly affect the funding of the institution, even in the same year. 
The government can allocate additional funding in case of a general increase in student 
enrolments or for setting up new study programmes that meet particular labour market 
needs. 
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Though capacity funding may include elements of funding models described earlier in 
this study, it can be particularly interesting to reflect on the mechanism in the 
Kazakhstani context as higher education aims to produce highly qualified graduates that 
are needed in the Kazakhstani labour market. Though the current State Grants system by 
its quotas is somehow linked to the employability of graduates, a stronger focus on 
labour market needs and planning to only spend public funding on activities that lead to 
“well employable graduates” may be a step ahead. In this sense, a more direct link to the 
number of graduates produced in certain universities and/or study programmes could be 
interesting to look at. 
2.5.3. Strengthening scientific research and its societal impact 
 
The third strategic priority area for Kazakhstan’s higher education is the development of 
its scientific research base and the societal impact of research. This is for example 
demonstrated in the ambition to position a few Kazakhstani universities higher up in the 
global rankings and to better integrate higher education, research and innovation as well 
as strengthening university-industry relationships. 
 
Role of the current funding model 
 
This project has had a limited focus on research funding. Most public funds for research 
are awarded on the basis of competitive funding to which individual researchers, groups 
and institutes can apply with particular research proposals. The project so far did not 
assess the criteria used for allocating the competitive grants, whether the central budget 
is divided in separate budgets for different disciplinary fields such as STEM, medicine, 
and social sciences. 
 
There also appears to be a stable stream of basic research funding for national 
universities, but what this exactly entails in terms of volume and allocation mechanism 
between institutes and universities has remained unclear in the project. 
 
Indirectly, the high tariff of State Grants for national universities compared to the tariff 
for state universities and JSC universities is not only covering the higher salaries of 
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academics working in the national universities but also provides a basis for research 
activities. 
 
The 1% tax levy on company revenues is said to also feed into a central fund governed 
by the MoES (about 300 million tenge) that is distributed for research projects in 
universities together with industry. 
 
There are about 500 PhD grants allocated on an annual basis. This is regarded as a 
number that is too limited related to the research ambitions of the country, but anyhow 
provides a vast research capacity in at least a selected number of universities , mostly 
the national universities. 
 
Altogether, there is no full transparent overview of the research funding in the system. 
However, the fact that a few Kazakhstani universities take relatively good positions in 
the world university rankings (QS WUR and Times Higher Education WUR) assumes 
that they have a substantive research base to produce high quality research leading to 
substantial research outputs such as highly ranked publications, patents, etc. If the 
number of universities that become visible in the global rankings should increase, this 
requires a substantial further research investment. 
 
The development towards a stronger research system and societal impact will be 
analysed on the basis of how well the current Kazakhstani funding mechanisms relate to 
the criteria of stability, performance orientation and innovation orientation. 
 
Stability, performance and innovation orientation 
 
Stability: Because the main research funds are provided on a competitive basis this 
does not provide guaranteed stable research revenues for universities. As a result, not all 
academics have a guaranteed proportion of time to be dedicated to (fundamental) 
research. Only those successful in the national research competition can ensure such a 
claim. As in many competitive systems for allocating research funding – e.g. through 
research councils like DFG in Germany or NWO in the Netherlands – once successful 
researchers or units tend to remain successful over the years. This is partially a result of 
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the evaluation criterion of past performance and thus confidence that the 
researcher/group can perform good research. As such, also such a competitive system 
generates its own forms of stability. 
 
Performance: The competitive research funding allocation implies a high level of 
performance orientation. However, as it appeared from the stakeholder interviews that 
only a few institutions are relatively successful in this area, the performance incentives 
for institution with only little or no competitive research funding is low. In many cases, 
institutions are somehow out of this “ball game”. 
 
Innovation: There has been no evidence on the issue whether the competitive research 
funding stimulates innovation. Nevertheless, the Ministry indicated that there are 
initiatives of setting up autonomous cluster funds in which industry has to participate in 
the research and funding of projects. This should guarantee more applied and innovative 
research. In addition, there is an initiative to establish a “business campus” with strong 
public-private partnerships. At this moment, universities are expected to work towards 
generating endowment funds, but this is not stimulated by public financial incentives. 
 
Potential areas of improvement 
 
A first area of improving the research funding area would be a more transparent 
description of the research system and funding mechanisms, including the award 
criteria, procedures, processes and actual allocations. This should also include the new 
initiatives, such as using the 1% tax levy funds, the business campus and expected 
university-industry co-funded research projects. 
 
Increased transparency can improve the level playing field between the various actors in 
the system. 
 
It appears that the relatively entrepreneurial privately oriented universities are quite 
active in engaging with business and industry. They use many small scale initiatives for 
this, such as internships, professional training and leadership programmes, various 
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smaller scale joint research projects (also conducted by students), involving business to 
invest in modern teaching and research facilities, guest lecturers, etc. 
International good practice examples. 
 
To provide  Kazakhstan’s higher education system with some food for thought for the 
ambitions to further develop the research base and strengthen the links between 
research, the economy and society at large, the following international examples may 
provide some inspiring ideas. 
 
Funding formula for research 
 
As discussed in Section 5.1, funding formulas can stimulate transparency, quality and 
performance in higher education and research. One outspoken example in this area is 
Finland. As demonstrated in the figure presented on page 30 of this Report, the Finnish 
funding model (Halonen, 2014) includes a substantial part for research that is mainly 
oriented towards performances and outputs, such as PhD degrees, scientific 
publications, success in competitive research funding, such as from Research Councils 
and EU funding opportunities. 
 
The current model in which research funding is predominantly awarded through the 
competitive grants scheme, competition, transparency and quality are guaranteed. 
However, the current basic allocations of research funds to national universities appears 
to be intransparent according to the interviewees of the Roadmap project. In such a 
situation, using a funding formula could help stimulating quality, performance 
orientation as well as stimulating transparency and legitimacy. Such a formula could 
also include a substantial historical component to prevent enormous budget changes 
between years and institutions. 
 
Boosting universities in the global university rankings 
 
Because many countries increasingly focus on research excellence and the position of 
their universities in the global university rankings, they develop organisational 
structures and financial instruments that promote a development towards research focus, 
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mass and excellence. As such, many countries would like to increase their number of 
universities that show high (or higher) up in these university rankings. Kazakhstan also 
has the ambition to have at least 2 universities reaching to the top-200 of the QS-WUR 
ranking system. One already achieved this objective in 2016. 
 
Because it is difficult to reach this type of excellence, some countries merge universities 
and research institutes to generate focus and mass in research priorities, such as in 
Denmark and France (Benneworth et al., 2010). Other countries invest large sums of 
additional money, such as Germany through the “Excellence Initiative” to support a 
limited number of promising universities. In other countries, a redistribution of funds 
towards a few universities is aimed at achieving a few world class universities, such as 
in South Korea and China. Most countries that do such operations heavily invest in such 
processes. This often implies a strong imbalance in terms of funding between the 
prestigious “excellence” universities and the others. In many countries, the excellence 
of the one goes at the expense of the quality of the others. As such, given the limits of 
public expenditure on higher education and science, the Kazakhstani government 
probably has to make a firm choice between boosting one or a few universities in the 
global university rankings or strengthening the quality of science in Kazakhstan’s 
higher education across the board. International practice shows different answers to 
such a question. 
 
Examples: stimulating excellence and performance in rankings 
 
In 2010, a Dutch committee on the future sustainability of higher education decided that 
given the already good ranking position of most Dutch research universities (11 of the 
13 being among the top 200 in the Times Higher Education World University Rankings) 
there was no further need to invest in a few universities at the expense of the others 
(Veerman et al., 2010).  
 
Germany, established the “excellence initiative” in 2007 (Klump et al., 2013). This in 
fact was a major national investment in research performance, focused on graduate 
schools, research clusters and institutional strategies to promote excellence. The 
invitation to set up research clusters strongly stimulated collaboration between 
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universities and non-university research organisations because it entailed a highly 
selective peer review process. While vast amounts of funding have been invested, the 
unclarity of future sustainable funding makes the “excellence initiative” a contested one.  
 
Similar programs have been developed in Denmark and France, though in these cases 
funding was limited in terms of money and the period in which it was allocated. In 
Denmark, the national research institutes were integrated into the universities. The 
newly merged universities had to demonstrate in a business plan how they would secure 
financial sustainability after the state funding period. In France “campus France” the 
program created research excellence in larger city areas, connecting various higher 
education institutions and research institutes into regional “poles” or “research cluster” 
that would be large enough to jointly appear in the university rankings. 
 
Other options to strengthen scientific research and impact 
 
The ambition to strengthen research and societal impact receives substantial impact in 
various countries. This ambition not only has been officially formulated in the national 
higher education strategy (SPESD) but has also been addressed by several of the 
interviewees in the Roadmap project, particularly by representatives of the national 
universities and the prestigious private (JSC) universities. In order to reach these 
objectives, several countries apply different funding instruments to achieve (part of) 
such ambitions. We will briefly discuss two main types of such instruments that may be 
interesting in the context of Kazakhstan’s higher education. 
 
 Various countries apply forms of research evaluations of faculties, disciplinary 
groups or whole universities. This is for example common practice in Australia, 
Germany, Norway, New Zealand, the Netherlands and the UK (Deen and 
Vossensteyn, 2006). In the Netherlands, all research groups or units within 
universities have to participate in an externally organised research review, which 
assesses their functioning against three: 1) research quality; 2) relevance to society; 
and 3) viability (KNAW, VSNU and NWO, 2016). In the UK, research funding to a 
substantial extent is linked to the outcomes of a national research evaluation exercise. 
In 2012, Research Assessment Exercise was replaced with the Research Excellence 
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Framework. In this exercise, every five years research groups are rated against each 
other in terms of quality (http://www.ref.ac.uk/). The highest scoring groups will 
receive substantially more research funds than the lower ranked groups. One can 
imagine that – in Kazakhstan – a research evaluation process assessing the quality of 
research groups funded with public money can contribute to the transparency of the 
system, to the awareness of quality, to identify strengths and weaknesses and to 
inform strategic investments of limited research funds. Against the backdrop of   
Kazakhstan’s high ambitions – e.g. as expressed in the State Program for education 
development 2011-2020 (MoES, 2010) – one could consider a mechanism that 
combines academic research performance, in terms of research output, with societal 
relevance and impact, e.g. in terms of attracting funding from industry, from 
international sources, patents, spin-off companies, etc. 
 
 In a balanced funding model, next to stable basic funding and performance oriented 
funding, systems also require space for innovation and creativity. New initiatives to 
promote teaching or research innovation often require seed money. An innovation 
fund can provide the financial space for such initiatives, of course on the basis of 
sound project and business plans and in competition with other creative and 
innovative ideas. As such, some countries implement a specific central research and 
innovation fund that  provides research organizations with a premium if they 
successfully attract funds from industry, collaborate with companies in research and 
innovation projects (Arnhold et al., 2014). In some countries such a fund matches 
research projects that are capable of attracting 50% of the resources from private 
partners. Or some universities themselves provide relatively small premiums if 
research groups attract specific types of externally funded research projects, like 
those from research councils or EU research programmes like ERC or Horizon 2020. 
For example, many Dutch universities offer such a top-up of €2,500 to €15,000 per 
annum per FTE-research time funded through the project or as a proportion of the 
total budget provided for the project (Arnhold et al., 2014). Another example in this 
area is the “knowledge vouchers” used in the Netherlands that stimulate industry or 
SME’s to “buy” a limited amount of knowledge or advice from universities under the 
condition that the company also invests itself in such knowledge collaboration. The 
“knowledge vouchers” are paid by public authorities (ministries, provinces or 
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regions) supported by the EU Interreg program (https://www.liof.com/en; 
http://www.interregeurope.eu/). Some other countries use the idea of an innovation 
fund to  support new promising innovative initiatives in the area of teaching or 
research system but that require short-term seed money. In Germany, such funding 
particularly is available in the STEM sector where a technology and innovation fund 
supports a selective number of innovative projects in science and engineering 
(Arnhold et al., 2014). All such initiatives could in Kazakhstan be promoted with the 
funding generated by the 1% tax levy on (regional) industry profits. This can be 
organised at state level or maybe at the level of the regions (akims). 
 
2.5.4. Strengthening the management and monitoring of higher education and 
science 
 
The fourth strategic priority area defined for Kazakhstan’s higher education is about a 
better transparency and monitoring system that allows for stronger managerial and 
steering capacity at various levels. This is not directly related to funding models that 
steer the higher education system. Nevertheless, if management capacity, monitoring, 
accountability and good objective information systems have to be (further) developed, 
this generally requires substantial investments. 
 
In the interviews with various stakeholders, a need for more objective and valid data 
was often mentioned. This concerns the real “costs of education”, reliable employability 
statistics, outcomes of research competitions, numbers of students, dropouts and 
graduates at various levels and institutions and by various background characteristics, 
staff, remuneration, etc. 
 
Role of the current funding model 
 
Though some data are collected, often centrally, the MoES often also has to rely on data 
delivered by the individual universities. This for example is the case with employability 
statistics. If this is a crucial factor for allocating State Grants, transparency and 
accountability requirements would request valid objective data. This being questions by 
several stakeholders indicates that this is not a sustainable situation. 
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During the interviews, there was no mentioning of large data collection projects in order 
to improve management information in  Kazakhstan’s higher education system. This 
suggests that no real innovation will take place in this area yet. The same goes for the 
felt need for professionalization of management staff. 
 
Potential areas of improvement 
 
What could be done in Kazakhstan’s higher education is to allocate limited, but targeted 
resources to develop some most urgent monitoring systems, e.g. in the area of 
employability of graduates (including employment rates after 6 and/or 18 months), 
international accreditations acquired by study programmes); external revenues 
generated by universities (e.g. from competitive research grants; from industry; from 
EU research & collaboration programmes; etc.); alumni surveys; employer satisfaction 
surveys, or other information deemed of high importance. 
 
Another type of initiative could be to organise and fund some crucial management 
training for strategic higher education managers, like university rectors, deans, finance 
directors, HR directors, etc. 
 
International good practice examples 
 
Internationally, there is a range of monitoring instruments that, often at national level, 
provide key-information on developments in the system. Relevant for the Kazakhstani 
situation are for instance labour market survey and research instruments. Examples are: 
 
Graduate destination surveys 
 
Several countries conduct so-called graduate destination surveys which explore the 
transition from school to work, including their employment situation, the types of jobs 
they hold, the extent to which their education is well-related to the demands of the 
professional practice, the satisfaction about their education and competences, salary 
levels, types of functions, etc.  
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 This for example happens in the Netherlands through the HBO- and WO-
Monitors (http://roa.sbe.maastrichtuniversity.nl/?portfolio=school-leaver-
surveys). This delivers detailed reports on the state of affairs over the years 
(http://www.vereniginghogescholen.nl/system/knowledge_base/attachments/file
s/000/000/579/original/Factsheet_HBO-Monitor_2015_v1.pdf?1465802597). 
 Another example is the Australian Graduate Destination Survey which collects 
information about graduate employment outcomes, previous employment, 
continuing study, work-seeking status, past education and key characteristics, 
such as residency status, recent qualifications,  etc. 
(http://www.graduatecareers.com.au/research/start/agsoverview/ctags/gdso/). 
 At European level. Many of such data are envisaged to be brought together, in 
order to reach a more homogeneous data collection across countries as well as 
international comparative data. This is done by the EUROGRADUATE study 
(http://www.eurograduate.eu/). 
 
Student monitoring systems 
 
Another example can be found in many national “student monitoring” instruments that 
look at various aspects of student life, their personal residence situation, personal 
characteristics, income and expenditure,  and student satisfaction. These are brought 
together in the European project EUROSTUDENT (http://www.eurostudent.eu/). 
 
Professional management capacity development 
 
In a number of countries there are various training opportunities for higher education 
managers to further develop their knowledge and skills in the area of higher education 
management (Kovac and Vossensteyn, 2009). This ranges from a centrally established 
“higher education management academy” like the Leadership Foundation in the UK 
(https://www.lfhe.ac.uk/)., to specialised MBA programmes (e.g. the German MBA 
Higher Education and Science Management programme of the Osnabrück University of 
Applied Sciences, https://www.hs-osnabrueck.de/en/study/study-
offerings/master/higher-education-and-research-management-mba/) or short term 
individually organised professionalization courses. It appears that Kazakhstan a few 
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years ago has initiated a central management training programme to promote higher 
education leadership. 
Conclusion 
This report has provided an overview and analysis of the various funding instruments 
that are applied in Kazakhstan’s higher education, such as the State Grants, student 
loans, savings schemes for parents, the competitive research funding through the 
research council and the 1% tax levy over company profits. To get an understanding of 
the funding mechanisms, their strengths and weaknesses as well as their working in 
practice, a number of 15 interviews were conducted key stakeholders in Kazakhstan’s 
higher education system. All interviews and documentation on the financing of higher 
education in Kazakhstan in the next step has been analysed on the basis of a number of 
criteria for good funding mechanisms in higher education which are applied in various 
settings: stability, performance orientation and innovation orientation (Arnhold et al., 
2014; de Boer et al., 2014; Vossensteyn et al., 2013). In addition, Kazakhstan’s funding 
mechanisms have been analysed regarding the extent to which they align with the 
strategic priorities as formulated in the State program for education and science 
development 2016-2019 (SPESD). To spur the debate in Kazakhstan’s higher education, 
the report finally discussed a number of funding options that can be considered if one 
wants to stimulate the quality of teaching, enhance the employability of graduates; 
strengthen the research base and its impact on society and to stimulate innovation. 
These reflections are illustrated with a number of practical international examples of 
how particular funding options are implemented in other countries, predominantly based 
on the international research literature. Finally, a few policy initiatives have been 
identified that often are regarded important to accompany funding instruments, like 
proper monitoring and data collection, quality assurance of teaching (and research) and 
professionalization of staff. 
 
The report does not aim at providing a blue-print for a funding model that can be 
implemented in Kazakhstan. It provides food for thought , in which to n to align the 
funding instruments with the national strategic objectives for higher education. Instead, 
the paper has identified the main characteristics of the current funding model for higher 
education in Kazakhstan and assessed how these are aligned with the strategic 
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objectives of the system as well as how they relate to some key principles of “good 
funding mechanisms”.  
 
Altogether, we can conclude that Kazakhstan’s higher education system has a rather 
unique funding arrangement with its strong orientation towards full-tuition fee-paying 
students and all public subsidies being purely allocated on the basis of academic merit 
of students through the State Grants system. In general, the level of public investments 
in higher education is rather low, but it is extraordinary to notice so many students 
being able and willing to pay the full-fees. 
 
Though at first sight, the State Grants system appears as a “voucher-like” funding 
model in which students “vote with their feet”, the limitation by State Grant quotas over 
disciplines and institutions makes that students have less freedom to choose what they 
want to study and where. However, an interesting phenomenon is that the quotas per 
institution and study programme depend on the employability of graduates. Those 
institutions that can enroll state granted students, have to comply with a lot of 
centralised administrative procedures and bureaucracy.  
The analysis further indicated that the performance orientation in the current 
Kazakhstani funding arrangements is relatively weak, particularly in the area of 
strengthening the quality of teaching and learning, using modern educational 
technologies and preparing graduates with competences that are required in the labour 
market. With respect to research, the strong focus on competitive research grants does 
not yet appear to stimulate the envisaged growing integration of science, higher 
education and applications in society and the economy. Also here, incentives to 
stimulate innovation and collaboration with other societal partners is underdeveloped. In 
this sense, current funding arrangements can be improved. 
However, though funding arrangements are important for system steering, they cannot 
function properly without accompanying instruments, such as a fair but tough quality 
assurance system, proper data and monitoring instruments and professional 
management and leadership capacity. 
 
In the final section of this report, alternative funding instrument were described and 
references to other countries with respected approaches were provided as food for 
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thought to inspire the process of the further strategic development of the higher 
education sector in Kazakhstan. 
Recommendations for policy makers and higher education leaders  
This study has provided a detailed analysis of financing mechanisms in Kazakhstan’s 
higher education system – including the State Grants system, private tuition fees, 
student loans, family savings plans, research funds for universities as well as the 1% tax 
levy on business profits for higher education purposes. The first type of analyses 
included a description of the financing system and the dynamics it generates for the day-
to-day operation of universities. That was on the basis of a literature, including 
academic and policy papers, and by a number of interviews with about 30 
representatives from the whole higher education system. The data stemming from these 
sources were analysed by using the key strategic objectives of higher education in 
Kazakhstan and principles of “good funding models”, such as stability, performance 
orientation and stimulation of innovation. The analyses were further added with 
international examples of various alternative models to fund teaching and research in 
higher education. All in all, the analyses result in the following recommendations. 
These are structured by recommendations regarding the financing of higher education in 
Kazakhstan and recommendations concerning other system conditions. 
 
Recommendations regarding funding arrangements 
 
 To provide a basis for high quality teaching and research in Kazakhstan’s higher 
education, there is a need for increased financial resources. At the moment, there 
appears to be a situation of underfunding. 
 To align Kazakhstan’s higher education system with the national strategic objectives, 
public funds could be best targeted directly at higher education institutions. The 
current State Grants may increase competition (for the best students), but the system 
is already to a large extent driven by competition due to the heavy reliance on tuition 
fees.  
 To promote stability, quality and performance, the Kazakhstan higher education 
system could benefit from a funding approach that includes a mix of stability and 
72 
 
performance incentives. Stability funding could go to institutions and programmes 
that are regarded of national importance and that cannot survive in the full-tuition 
model. Performance orientation, such as a funding formula including performances 
in terms of passed credits, degrees awarded and employability of graduates, can be 
used to distribute funding among programmes offering recognised “high quality”, 
e.g. on the basis of strict accreditation requirements. 
 One could consider whether it is possible to expand the number of students publicly 
subsidised. This could create a more equal “level playing field” for different higher 
education institutions by equalising to some extent the funding situation and 
competitive positions between the national universities, state universities and JSC 
institutions. This can be achieved by increasing public spending, which under the 
current conditions could lead to more students with State Grants. 
 The above mentioned situation can also be achieved by introducing tuition fees for 
all students. Under the current conditions, the best scoring UNT students consume all 
public subsidies, while it is known that many of them come from family backgrounds 
that socially and financially enable them to pay (part of) the costs of higher 
education. Both from an equity of access perspective as well as efficiency 
considerations, this appears to be a missed opportunity to generate more revenues for 
higher education while also stimulating equity of access as this would allow to spend 
part of the public resources on promising students that need financial help. For 
example, making current State Granted students paying half of the tuition costs, 
would enable to have 50% of all students being state subsidised students. 
 Another way to promote high quality education (and research) is to create 
opportunities to develop and experiment with teaching innovations funded by a 
(small) innovation fund. One can think of subsidising some initiatives to implement 
new didactical approaches to include ICT innovations (e.g. flipped-classroom), or 
learning methods that stimulate new types of skills for graduates, such as 
entrepreneurship, creativeness, collaboration etc. 
 As students and their families hardly use the instruments that are provided to 
stimulate equity of access, such as student loans and the family savings plans 
(SEAS), one may consider to make student loans more attractive by relaxing the 
borrowing and repayment conditions. Such a mechanism may not only attract more 
students into higher education would be willing to invest in higher education, it could 
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also accompany a mechanism of more general tuition fees if that would be socially 
and politically acceptable. 
 
Recommendations regarding other conditions in the higher education system 
 
 From a financial sustainability perspective, one might consider whether the number 
of higher education institutions is not too large in a system that is so strongly 
dominated by tuition fee paying students. Many institutions, also many state-
universities struggle to survive because in several cases, they may be too small to 
bear the risks of such strong market dependency. This calls for a deeper analysis of 
whether the system structure and the role of the different universities fit with the 
strategic priorities of the country. 
 Partially related to the previous recommendation, the level of financial autonomy of 
higher education institutions should be increased to enable a more efficient use of 
(public) financial resources. For example, relaxing regulations on student-teacher 
ratios, public procurement regulations and contract activities may increase efficiency 
and resource diversification in higher education institutions. 
 It appears that there is a need for a transparent mechanism to identify and recognise 
the quality of education and research. The current list of external (international) 
accreditations that are recognized as good quality may have to be revisited. 
 To inform a potential new funding mechanism and their allocative implications, a 
proper estimate of the costs related to higher education teaching is required. At the 
moment, due to the many differences in the costs at which various higher education 
institutions produce students and graduates, a proper price-quality relationship is not 
known. 
 A central system that would provide more transparent information and data on higher 
education in Kazakhstan would be a great benefit to the system. A “management 
information system that applies uniform system-wide definitions regarding student 
numbers, dropouts, successful completions, employability but also regarding 
research performance, resource diversification and knowledge transfer informs 
institutional and public policy making. Linking to the definitions used in global 
university rankings, such as QS WUR (familiar to local higher education leaders in 
74 
 
Kazakhstan), THE WUR and U-Multirank also allows stronger international 
attraction and benchmarking. 
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